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"Attainment of a great national policy ... must not be confined within
narrow canons for equitable relief deemed suitable by chancellors in
ordinary private controversies. "t
I. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of federal discrimination statutes has posed for the federal
courts new and difficult questions that have generated a new round of debate concern-
ing the role of the judiciary in a modem statutory setting. Part of the debate concerns
the authority of the federal courts pursuant to the doctrine of equitable discretion to
deny or otherwise limit injunctive relief in the face of a clear or proven violation of a
federal statute. This question recently surfaced in Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,1 in
which Justice White, writing for the Supreme Court, stated that the "grant of jur-
isdiction to insure compliance with a statute hardly suggests an absolute duty to do so
under any and all circumstances, and a federal judge sitting as chancellor is not
mechanically obligated to grant an injunction for every violation of law." 2 Mr.
Justice Powell concurred in the opinion of the Court but agreed with Mr. Justice
Stevens, the lone dissenter, that Congress may limit a court's equitable discretion in
granting remedies under a particular statute, and that some statutes may constrain
discretion more than others. 3 This debate also has generated a great deal of scholarly
attention.4 This Article grows out of the larger debate but has as its focus a more
limited thesis.
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law. B.A. 1961, University of Connecticut; J.D. 1965,
Boston University School of Law. The author expresses his appreciation to Tina Petrig for her research assistance on this
Article.
t Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.. 424 U.S. 747, 778 (1976) (citing Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313
U.S. 177, 188 (1941)).
1. 456 U.S. 305 (1982).
2. Id. at 313.
3. Id. at 321.
4. See, e.g., 0. Fiss. THE CIVIL RIGHTs INJUNCTION (1978) (critical discussion of the characteristics of injunctions
differentiating them from other remedies); G. CALABRESi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AOE OF STATUTES (1982) (arguing
that the courts should have the power to treat statutes in precisely the same way that they treat common law); Plater,
Statutory Violations and Equitable Discretion, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 524 (1982) (arguing that when a court of equity is
confronted on the merits with a continuing violation of statutory law, it has no discretion or authority to balance the
equities to permit that violation to continue); Laycock, Book Review, 57 T-x. L. REV. 1065 (1979) (reviewing 0. Fiss,
TiE CtVIL RHTs INJUNCTION (1978)); Mikva, Book Review, 96 HARV. L. REV. 534 (1982) (reviewing G. Calabresi, A.
CoMM.toN LAw FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982)); Coffin, Book Review, 91 YALE L.J. 827 (1982) (reviewing G.
Calabresi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982)). See also G. McDOWELL, EQUITY AND THE CONSTITU-
"nON (1982).
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The national policy against discrimination in employment on the basis of race,
sex, national origin, religion, and age is firmly embodied in a host of federal statutes
and regulations. 5 Although Congress has established two enforcement schemes for
these statutes-administrative and judicial-the federal courts have the ultimate
enforcement responsibility. 6 The courts often bifurcate the trials in employment
discrimination cases because of complex legal rules, the types and quantum of proof
that the courts must evaluate to determine the substantive liability issues, and prob-
lems of fashioning effective relief. The liability determination phase of the trial,
referred to as stage I proceedings, is only the first "sensitive and difficult ' 7 step a
court faces when a plaintiff or a class of plaintiffs seeks redress from employment
discrimination. In the relief stage, referred to as stage II proceedings, a court faces
the equally sensitive and difficult responsibility of framing appropriate relief that
must be designed to serve a dual purpose: to remedy past violations and to ensure that
the defendant will not engage in similar unlawful conduct in the future.8 The focus of
this Article is on the statutory authority of the courts in the stage II proceedings to
deny or otherwise limit complete relief in employment discrimination cases.
The basic thesis of this Article is that the Supreme Court has, in Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody9 and Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.,'0 substantially
5. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621-634 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); Equal Pay
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976 & Supp. III 1979); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. 111978). See also C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, FEDERAL STATUTORY
LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION (1980); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW (2d ed.
1983).
6. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974). Congress has provided a mandate to the
federal courts under each of these laws to develop theories of liability, standards of proof, and theories of relief through
the use of injunctive relief so that, to the extent possible, all prohibited forms of discrimination can be eliminated "root
and branch."
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), established as the federal enforcement agency under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976), has been given the responsibility for
administrative enforcement of claims of employment discrimination arising under Title VII, the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d) (1976), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. H3 621-634 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
President Carter's Reorganization Plan No. 1, effective October 1, 1979, Executive Order No. 12068, Fed. Reg. 28,971
(June 20, 1978). The purpose of the Reorganization Plan was to consolidate in one ederal administrative agency, to the
extent practicable, all of the federal enforcement efforts. The private right of action is retained under all the acts, e.g.,
Title VII, the Equal Pay Act, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
7. United States Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 103 S. Ct. 1478, 1482 (1983). The federal courts have
faced three generations of issues in the employment discrimination cases. The first generation issues are those primarily
procedural in nature. The second generation issues are those involving the theories of liability, and the types and quantum
of proof necessary to establish a violation under the laws prohibiting discrimination in employment. Finally, the third
generation issues involve the task of formulating effective relief. See Belton, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A
Decade of Private Enforcement andJudicial Developments, 20 ST. Louis U.L.J. 225, 228 (1976). This Article deals with
the third generation issues.
8. The designation of stage I and stage II proceedings in the employment discrimination cases was initially
developed in a line of class action cases in the Fifth Circuit. See, e.g., United States v. United States Steel Corp.. 520
F.2d 1043, 1053-54 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817 (1976); Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Refining Corp., 495
F.2d 437,443-44 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211.
257, 259 (5th Cir. 1974). The court first used the terms "stage I" and "stage II" in United States v. United States Steel
Corp., 520 F.2d 1043, 1053-54 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817 (1976). Accord, Stewart v. General Motors
Corp., 542 F.2d 445,450-53 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 919 (1977). FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b) authorizes acourt
to "order a separate trial ... of any separate issue." The bifurcated procedure may also be used in the individual cases.
The Supreme Court has recognized the appropriateness of bifurcated proceedings in employment discrimination cases.
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 361 (1977).
9. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
10. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
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narrowed the circumstances that can be relied on by lower courts attempting to apply
the traditional notions of equitable discretion to deny or otherwise limit complete and
necessary injunctive relief for proven violations in the employment discrimination
cases. Although the lower courts have recognized that Moody limits the circum-
stances in which complete relief may be denied under the doctrine of equitable
discretion," they have not consistently followed the mandate of Moody and Franks
that requires the application of "principled ... standards"1 in the exercise of equit-
able discretion to remedy proven violations in the employment discrimination cases.
The purpose of this Article, then, is to analyze Moody and Franks and to identify the
major guidelines dictated by the Supreme Court for the lower courts to follow. These
guidelines were enunciated by the Court to limit reliance on equitable discretion,
which "varies like the Chancellor's foot,' 13 frustrates important national goals
embodied in the federal statutes on employment discrimination, 14 and "produces
different results . . . [in cases] that cannot be differentiated in policy."' 15
11. See, e.g., Palmer v. General Mills Inc., 600 F.2d 595, 598 (6th Cir. 1979) (Moody "laid down extensive
guidelines which it ruled were to limit the exercise of the discretion given the trial judge to award or refuse to award
backpay [where a finding of discrimination has been made)"); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 469-71
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (Moody clarified the scope of discretion to deny relief in employment discrimination cases, but the court
noted that no courts had addressed the question whether there is discretion to limit as well as deny back pay).
12. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975).
13. Id. at 417 n.10 (citing Gee v. Pritchard, 36 Eng. Rep. 670, 674 (1818)).
14. Id. at 417.
15. Id. (citing Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 405 (1970)). The discussion in this Article is based
on the assumption that the plaintiff or a class has established a violation in stage I under the applicable statute on
employment discrimination. The Article is further limited to claims of employment discrimination based on federal
statutory law. For an excellent discussion of the role of equitable discretion and federal statutory law generally, see Plater,
supra note 4. The author of this Article found Professor Plater's article both helpful and provocative.
The principal emphasis in this Article is on Title VII, but the award of injunctive relief is subject to the doctrine of
equitable discretion regardless of whether the claim arises under Title VII, the Equal Pay Act, or the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy & Associates, 358 U.S. 207, 213-15 (1959) (issuance of
an injunction under the Fair Labor Standards Act rests within the sound discretion of the district court); Shultz v. Mistletoe
Express Service, Inc., 434 F.2d 1267, 1271J(10th Cir. 1970) (when a district court mistakenly believes that an injunction
is mandatory once a violation is established, it will be reversed under the abuse of discretion standard). See also Lorillard
v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 n. 13 (1978) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act). In addition, the courts have regularly
used the substantive and procedural theories developed in the Title VII cases as analytical models in the equal pay and age
discrimination cases. Brennan v. Cities Stores, Inc., 479 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1973) (Equal Pay Act). The recent decision of
the Supreme Court in County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981), construing the Bennett Amendment to
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h), has attempted to harmonize the relationship between Title VII and the Equal Pay Act.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. 111978)
("Title VII"), makes it unlawful for employers (public and private), labor organizations, and employment agencies to
discriminate on the basis of race, sex, national origin, or religion in "terms, conditions and privileges of employment," or
to classify employees or applicants for employment in "any way that would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect" an employee or applicant for employment "because of race,
sex, national origin or religion." Id. § 2000e-2(a). If a court finds that a defendant has engaged in or is intentionally
engaging in practices prohibited by the Act, it may issue injunctive relief and order "such affirmative action as may be
appropriate," including back pay reaching two years before the plaintiff filed a charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. Id. § 2000e-5(g). A prevailing plaintiff is also entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's
fees. Id. § 2000e-5(k).
The Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976), prohibits an employer from discriminating on the basis of
sex in the payment of wages when employees of opposite sex are performing jobs that require equal skill, effort, and
responsibility and which are performed under substantially the same working conditions, unless justified by one of the
four enumerated affirmative defenses: a seniority system, a merit system, a system that measures pay by quality or
quantity of production, or any other factor not based on sex. The Equal Pay Act was enacted in 1963, as an amendment to
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963). If a plaintiff proves a substantive violation
of the Act, a court may order relief as provided by the FLSA, including unpaid wages and an additional amount as
"liquidated damages," 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), (c) (Supp. III 1979). Recovery is normally limited to two years, but is
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To aid in an understanding of the effect of Moody and Franks on the scope of
equitable discretion in the stage II proceedings, the source and nature of the issue the
Court addressed in these cases will be outlined briefly in Part II of this Article. Part
III raises and discusses the question whether it is possible to identify a unitary
purpose permeating the federal laws prohibiting various forms of discrimination. A
discussion of this question is helpful because Congress' purpose in enacting a statute,
and the enforcement scheme established to accomplish that purpose, informs a court
of its authority to order relief upon a finding of a violation. Moody and Franks are
analyzed in Part IV. Finally, Parts V and VI discuss and summarize the Supreme
Court guidelines the lower federal courts are mandated to follow in stage II pro-
ceedings.
II. THE SOURCE AND NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
In the stage II proceedings of employment discrimination cases the federal
district courts are concerned with tailoring remedies. The law of remedies1 6 deals
with the nature and scope of relief to which a plaintiff may be entitled after he or she
or the class represented by the plaintiff has proved a violation of a protected sub-
stantive right. Judicial remedies can be classified in several different ways. Thus, for
example, it is possible to classify remedies as either equitable or legal. This
classification is based upon the history of the development of the courts of law and
equity at common law; these courts developed as separate institutions with separate
rules of substance, procedure, and relief. It is also possible to separate remedies into
four broad categories: damages or monetary relief designed to compensate a plaintiff
for economic loss; restitutional relief designed to prevent unjust enrichment; coer-
cive, equitable or injunctive relief backed by the contempt power of a court; and
declaratory relief designed to clarify the substantive rights of the parties. 17
extended to three years for a "willful violation." 29 U.S.C. § 255 (1976). In 1974, the definition of "employer" in the
FLSA was extended to include public agencies, id. § 203(d), thus bringing within its coverage state, local, and federal
employers.
The EEOC may seek injunctive relief prohibiting future violations of the Equal Pay Act, as well as a restraining order
against the withholding of wages due for past violations. In contrast to Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act, an individual discriminated against may not bring an action for prospective relief. See, e.g., Lorillard v. Pons,
434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978); Carey v. White, 375 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Del. 1974). A prevailing party is entitled to attorney's
fees.
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 to 634 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980), makes it unlawful for employers (public and private), labor organizations, and employment agencies to dis-
criminate against any individual between the ages of forty and seventy except, for example, when age is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business, or when the difference
in treatment is based on a factor other than age. See generally EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1056-58 (1933). A
plaintiff who prevails on his or her substantive claim is entitled to "legal and equitable" relief under section 7(b), 29
U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976) and to attorney's fees. Id.
16. The term "remedies" has been described as "chameleonic" because, when the context shifts, its meaning takes
on different colors and because of the continuing effort to distinguish the concept of a "right" from the concept of a
"remedy." K. PARKER, MODERN JUDICIAL REMEDIEs 10 (1975). 1 have attempted to use the term "relief" whenever
appropriate to avoid the confusion that the "rights/remedy" debate entails.
17. See DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REmEDIES § 1.1 (1973). The vast array of remedial relief was developed
at common law under the private law model of adjudication. The private law model traditionally has been a process of
resolving disputes among private parties. The public law model of adjudication developed primarily in connection with
public interest litigation and differs significantly from the private law model of adjudication. For a discussion of the
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Except where Congress has specifically mandated a particular form of relief or
has otherwise limited the form of relief that a court may award upon a finding of a
statutory violation, the federal courts have broad discretion under their inherent
equitable power to decide the form and extent of relief. 18 Congress has specified the
availability of both legal and equitable relief under some statutes on discrimination in
employment, 19 but the only form of relief under other statutes is equitable or in-
junctive. 20
As one commentator has so aptly noted, the major theme that runs throughout
injunctive or equitable relief is judicial discretion; the cases "abound with quaint
statements, such as that an application for an injunction is an appeal to the chancel-
lor's conscience; that the injunction is a discretionary remedy; or that a court of equity
has the inherent power to create and fashion a flexible remedy."', Two of the
venerable formulas of equity jurisprudence that have survived the modem statutory
setting are that the basis for injunctive relief is irreparable injury and inadequacy of
legal remedies, and that an appeal to equity is an appeal to the court's discretion to
balance the equities. 22
Since Congress has not specifically mandated that any particular form of relief
such as back pay, reinstatement, or a hiring preference must be awarded upon a
finding of unlawful employment discrimination, and because Congress preserved the
traditional discretionary powers of the courts to formulate appropriate relief,2 3 a
major question the lower courts were required to answer was the extent to which
traditional notions of equitable discretion remained useable standards for granting,
denying or otherwise limiting complete relief in the stage II proceedings. Early in the
enforcement efforts under Title VII, the courts adopted a fundamentally liberal
philosophy when construing their remedial authority under section 706(g)2 4 of the
Act. In Asbestos Workers Local 53 v. Vogler,' for example, one of the leading
pre-Moody cases on section 706(g), the Fifth Circuit held that although a district court
distinction between the two modes of adjudication, see Chayes, The Role of The Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HAtv. L. REv. 1281 (1976). Because employment discrimination litigation in both the class action and individual action
cases implicate the public interest, this litigation more nearly resembles the public law model rather than the private law
model of adjudication. See generally Belton, A Comparative Review of Public and Private Enforcement of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 VARY. L. R~v. 905 (1978).
18. See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312-13 (1982); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 193 (1978).
19. The Court has characterized all forms of relief under Title VII as equitable. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 422 (1975). See also Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978). The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
provides for both legal and equitable relief. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1) (Supp. Ill 1979); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575
(1978) (upholding the right to trial by jury for legal relief under the Age Act). The Equal Pay Act also provides for legal
and equitable relief. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976).
20. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 422 (1975) (relief under Tite VII is equitable relief);
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978) (discussing the relationship between legal and equitable relief available under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
21. 0. Ftss, INwuNcrToNs 74 (1972). See also Plater, supra note 4.
22. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312-13 (1982).
23. See supra note 19.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). Titie VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17
(1976 & Supp. II 1978) makes it unlawful for public and private employers to discriminate on the basis of race, sex,
national origin or religion. Section 706(g) sets out the authority of the district courts to order relief upon a finding of a
violation of the Act. See infra text accompanying notes 94-97.
25. 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
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is vested with a large measure of discretion in molding a decree, a trial court must not
simply parrot the language of the Act's prohibitions, but is permitted, if not required,
to order such affirmative relief as may be appropriate: "Where necessary to ensure
compliance with the Act, the District Court [is] fully empowered to eliminate the
present effects of past discrimination" and to bar similar conduct in the future.2 6 The
basic remedial model of equitable discretion was deemed to be twofold: relief for past
violations and the prevention of similar conduct in the future.
Although the broad philosophical standard found in Vogler became the basic
framework for tailoring relief, the courts nevertheless began to formulate different
and conflicting standards on the application of this principle based upon a perceived
distinction between the various forms of relief and the mode-individual or class
action-in which the claims were presented to the courts. In the seniority discrimina-
tion cases the courts adopted the "rightful place" theory of relief.' Under the
rightful place theory, identifiable victims of seniority discrimination were entitled to
be credited with the seniority standing they would have had but for the unlawful
employment practices of the employer and union. The courts specifically held,
however, that the rightful place theory does not entitle a victim of discrimination to
"bump" an incumbent employee who had obtained a competitive economic and
employment advantage as a result of the practices found to be unlawful; the theory
was designed to prevent the award of employment opportunities on an unlawful basis
in the future.2 8 In the testing and educational requirements cases, the courts usually
enjoined the employer from the continued use of these devices until validated under
accepted methodologies; rarely did the court require the employer to adopt objective
selection and promotion practices. z9
The courts differed on the proper standard of discretion in the back pay cases.
Some courts held that back pay should be denied unless the plaintiff proved that the
unlawful employment practice had been "intentional" in the sense that the defendant
was motivated by a subjective desire to discriminate.30 Most courts, however, con-
strued the term "intentional" to mean only that the challenged employment practice
was deliberate rather than accidental.3 1 Other courts had adopted varying forms of a
26. Id. at 1052-53.
27. See Local 189, United Papermakers and Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 988 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970). The rightful place theory of relief was first advanced in Note, Title VII, Seniority
Discrimination, and the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1260 (1967), and initially adopted by the courts in Quarles
v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968). See also Cooper and Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair
Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HAv. L. REv. 1598 (1969).
The viability of the rightful place theory has been questioned in light of International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324 (1977), and United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
28. See, e.g., Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 268-69 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920
(1976).
29. See, e.g., Stevenson v. International Paper Co., 516 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1975); Rogers v. International Paper
Co., 510 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 423 U.S. 809 (1975); Pettway v. American Cast
Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974).
30. See, e.g., United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 464 F.2d 301, 308 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 116 (1973); Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338, 340 (D. Or. 1969).
31. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d
211 (5th Cir. 1974); Schaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 1972); Rowe v. General
Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972).
[Vol. 44:571
THE MOODY AND FRANKS STANDARDS
good faith defense. In the sex discrimination cases, for example, some courts held
that back pay could be denied where a defendant's practice was based upon a state
statute enacted to afford special protection to women. 32 Other courts viewed the
reliance upon state protective legislation for women as intentional discrimination, but
nevertheless denied back pay as a proper exercise of discretion.3 3 Still other courts
adopted either an "exceptional circumstances" 34 or a "special circumstances"
35
standard.
Although the authority of the federal courts to order race-specific or sex-specific
relief quotas had been widely accepted, 36 the courts had not established uniform
standards to determine when quotas were appropriate. Some courts held that quotas
were appropriate only in the hiring discrimination cases and not in the promotion
discrimination cases. 37 Other courts held that quotas were appropriate only in those
cases in which the defendant had engaged in a long and egregious history of past
discrimination. 3' The courts also appeared to consider the status of the defendant,
whether public or private, as relevant to the appropriateness of quota relief.
39
The difference in application of equitable discretion was further reflected in a
comparison between class actions and individual cases. Some courts refused to award
complete relief to plaintiffs who opted to proceed on an individual basis rather than
on a class action basis, even though the plaintiff was able to prove a pattern and
practice of unlawful discrimination in many of the terms and conditions of employ-
ment similar to the practices challenged in class action cases. 40 The rationale used to
deny individual relief in the systemic cases not brought as class actions was that the
plaintiff had failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 4 ' Even after Congress rejected the notion that discrimination in-
volved discrete and isolated instances of intentional attempts to treat individuals
differently because of, for example, race or sex,42 the courts continued to rely upon
32. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971).
33. Kober v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 480 F.2d 240, 246 (3d Cir. 1973); Manning v. International Union, 466
F.2d 812, 816 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 946 (1972).
34. See, e.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 253 (5th Cir. 1974).
35. Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134, 142 (4th Cir. 1973), affd on other grounds, 422 U.S. 405
(1975).
36. See Belton, Discrimination and Affirmative Action: An Analysis of Competing Theories of Equality and Weber,
59 N.C.L. Rav. 531, 560-68 (1981).
37. See, e.g., Kirkland v. N.Y. State Dep't of Correctional Serv., 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 823 (1976).
38. See, e.g., White v. Carolina Paperboard Corp., 564 F.2d 1073 (4th Cit. 1977).
39. See, e.g., Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333, 1341 (2d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975).
40. Compare, e.g., Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968); Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532
F.2d 511 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976) (allowing employment discrimination class actions under "private
attorney general" theory) with, e.g., Nance v. Union Carbide Corp., 540 F.2d 718 (4th Cir. 1976), vacated and
remanded, 431 U.S. 952 (1977); Danner v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 447 F.2d 159 (5th Cit. 1971) (refusing broad based
relief to individual plantiffs because action not brought as a class action). See also Note, To What Extent Can a Court
Remedy Classwide Discrimination in an Individual Suit Under Title VII?, 20 ST. Louis U.L.J. 388 (1976); Comment,
Goodman v. Schlesinger and the Headless Class Action, 60 B.U.L. REv. 348 (1980).
41. See infra note 40.
42. The legislative history of the 1972 amendments to Title V11 states that:
Employment discrimination as viewed today is a... complex and pervasive phenomenon. Experts familiar
with the subject now generally describe the problem in terms of 'systems' and 'effects' rather than simply
1983]
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Rule 23 to limit or otherwise deny complete relief to individual plaintiffs who proved
systemic discrimination.
43
The discharge and refusal-to-hire cases are perhaps the best illustrations of
situations in which the lower courts relied upon equitable discretion to grant, deny, or
otherwise limit complete relief. The different results reached in these cases, however,
could not be justified by policy considerations. The plaintiffs in the discharge and
refusal-to-hire cases often sought relief in the form of reinstatement or hiring pref-
erences. Although the courts did not rely on the traditional unwillingness of the courts
of equity to enforce contracts for personal service,44 they nevertheless grounded their
decisions in traditional principles of equity. Some courts characterized reinstatement
and hiring preferences as extraordinary equitable remedies and were willing to order
reinstatement only in those cases in which the plaintiff had suffered from egregious
forms of discrimination. 45 Other courts established a strong presumption in favor of
reinstatement or a hiring preference and placed the burden on the defendant to prove
that this form of relief should not be granted.46 All of the courts prior to Moody and
Franks, however, whether strongly in favor of or strongly opposed to reinstatement
as a matter of course, grounded their decisions in traditional notions of equitable
discretion such as irreparable injury, inadequacy of legal relief, and the obligation of
the court to balance the equities of the competing interests of the parties.47 The
balancing of the equities principle was the primary factor on which the different
results in similar cases were reached, and even under this principle the interests of the
plaintiff and defendant were the principal focus, with little attention given to the
public interest in the elimination of unlawful employment discrimination.
In light of the liberal philosophical standard that the courts enunciated on their
discretionary authority under section 706(g), it is difficult to explain these different
and conflicting results. A major factor appears to be that the lower courts felt com-
pelled, in the absence of guidance from Congress or the Supreme Court, to ground
their philosophical standard on traditional notions of equitable discretion such as
irreparable harm, inadequacy of the legal remedy, and the need to balance the com-
peting interests of the private parties, without factoring the public interest into the
calculus.48
intentional wrongs, and the literature on the subject is replete with discussions of, for example, the mechanics of
seniority and lines of progressions, perpetuation of the present effects of pre-act discriminatory practices
through various institutional devices, and testing and validation requirements.
S. Rep. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971). See also Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747,765 n.21
(1976).
43. See supra notes 40 & 42.
44. See generally, D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK OF THe LAW OF REEDIS 929 (1973); Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61,
92 n.68 (1974).
45. See, e.g., Young v. Edgcomb Steel Co., 499 F.2d 97 (4th Cir. 1974); NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir.
1974); Ash v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 483 F.2d 289 (6th Cir. 1973); Brito v. Zia Co., 478 F.2d 1200 (10th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Dillion Supply Co., 429 F.2d 800 (4th Cir. 1970). Compare, e.g., Burton v. Cascade School Dist. Union High
School No. 5, 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975) with Pred v. Board of Public
Instruction, 415 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1969).
46. See, e.g., Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1026-28 (1st Cir. 1974); Pettway v.
American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Hayes International Corp., 415 F.2d 1038
(5th Cir. 1969); Hairston v. McLean Trucking Co., 62 F.R.D. 642, 671 (M.D.N.C. 1974), affd in part, rev'd in part,
520 F.2d 226 (4th Cir. 1975); Dobbins v. Local 212 IBEW, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
47. See, e.g., supra notes 45 & 46.
48. See id.
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Another reason appears to be that in the stage II proceedings in both the class
action and the individual cases, the courts found that cloaking their results in tradi-
tional notions of discretion allowed them to avoid complex and technical problems
inherent in judicial attempts to remedy past discrimination by restructuring multi-
faceted employment practices.49 The courts recognized, even before Moody and
Franks, that formulating effective and complete relief required a court to engage in a
"quagmire of hypothetical judgments" 50 to determine the rightful place of victims of
discrimination. A further reason appears to be that while the courts were willing to
abandon the private law model of adjudication in establishing theories of liability in
the stage I proceedings, they felt compelled to retain the private law model for stage
II relief proceedings. 51
III. LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE AND ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
A. Legislative Purpose
The purpose behind congressional enactment of remedial legislation, and the
identities of the parties on whose behalf the legislation is passed, are not always clear.
The purpose of some legislation is clearer when Congress specifies the purpose in a
preamble or purpose clause. In the absence of an express statement, though, the
purpose can be subject to much debate. Congress has used both approaches with laws
prohibiting discrimination in employment.5 2 Even when Congress has included a
purpose clause, the courts must often resort to the legislative history to flesh out the
congressional intent since the purpose of the legislation is critical to a determination
of the nature and scope of the relief a court can order. 53
It is difficult to identify a unitary purpose underlying the various forms of
discriminatory policies and practices Congress has made unlawful, because the his-
torical and social causes of discrimination do not arise from a single source. Dis-
49. See, e.g.. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157. 1183 (5th Cir. 1978).
50. See id.
51. See Chayes, supra note 17.
52. The Preamble to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1976), provides:
(a) The Congress hereby finds and declares that-
(1) in the face of rising productivity and affluence, older workers find themselves disadvantaged in their
efforts to retain employment, and especially to regain employment when displaced from jobs;
(2) the setting of arbitrary age limits regardless of potential for job performance has become a common
practice, and certain otherwise desirable practices may work to the disadvantage of older persons;
(3) the incidence of unemployment, especially long-term unemployment with resultant deterioration
of skills, morale, and employer acceptability is, relative to the younger ages, high among older
workers; their numbers are great and growing. and their employment problems grve;
(4) the existence in industries affecting commerce, of arbitrary discrimination in employment be-
cause of age, burdens commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce.
The final version of Title VII does not have a purpose or preamble clause and thus, the question whether this statute is
designed to protect group rights or individual rights has generated much controversy. Support for both views is found in
the seminal Title VII case, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
53. SeeTVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153. 194-95 (1978) (The purpose and language of a federal statute controls the relief
a court may order.) Thus, for example, Congress has withdrawn the injunctive power from the federal court in labor
disputes except in limited circumstances. 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1976); Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770,
398 U.S. 235 (1970).
For a discussion of the debate over the purpose of Title VII, see Belton, Discrimination and Affirmative Action: An
Analysis of Competing Theories of Equality and Weber, 59 N.C.L. Rav. 531, 538-42 (1981). See also Abernathy, Title
VI and the Constitution: A Regulatory Model For Defining "Discrimination," 70 GEo. L.J. 1 (1981).
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crimination against women is based on traditions and historical perceptions about the
role of women in society and thus arises from social and psychological factors of
complex origins.54 Discrimination against blacks is based on the historical perception
of blacks as an inferior race, a perception that has its foundation in the institution of
slavery. 55 Obedience to a higher law is, in part, the basis for religious dis-
crimination.5 6 The status of race and sex are immutable characteristics that last a
lifetime, but individuals often move in and out of the groups protected by the laws
prohibiting age and religious discrimination.
Notwithstanding the different contours and underlying causes of the various
forms of discrimination and the difficulty of uncovering the reasons why Congress
may have banned various forms of discrimination in employment, it is possible to
make some generalizations about the legislative purposes that provide the foundations
for these laws. First, the laws prohibiting discrimination establish a national policy
that certain forms of discrimination are inconsistent with our democratic form of
government.57 Second, discrimination on the basis of race, sex, national origin, and
religion is an affront to human dignity and self-esteem. 58 Third, on the economic and
social levels, discrimination results in the waste of human resources and creates an
unnecessary burden on the community.59 Finally, the public interest is best served by
the elimination of various forms of discrimination that constitute artificial, arbitrary,
and unnecessary barriers to gainful employment when unrelated to job performance
and ability. 6°
54. The Supreme Court declared:
Congress' purpose in enacting the Equal Pay Act was to remedy what was perceived to be a serious and
endemic problem of employment discrimination in private industry--the fact that the wage structure of "many
segments of American industry has been based on an ancient but outmoded belief that a man, because of his role
in society, should be paid more than a woman even though his duties are the same." S. Rep. No. 176. 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1963). The solution was quite simple in principle: to require that "equal work will be
rewarded by equal wages." Id.
Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974).
In a similar vein, the Third Circuit has declared that the Equal Pay Act "was intended as a broad charter of women's
rights in the economic field. It sought to overcome the age-old belief in women's inferiority and to eliminate the
depressing effects on living standards of reduced wages for female workers and the economic and social consequences
which flow from it." Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 265 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 908 (1970). See
also Ammons v. Zia Co., 448 F.2d 117, 119 (9th Cir. 1971) ("both [the Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Acti 'serve
the same fundamental purpose"'); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 343 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Phillips v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring).
55. See generally Edwards & Zaretsky, Preferential Remedies for Employment Discrimination, 74 MicH. L. REv. 1
(1975).
56. See generally Edwards & Kaplan, Religious Discrimination and the Role of Arbitration Under Title VII, 69
MicH. L. REv. 599 (1971).
57. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433 (1971); Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d
283, 294 (5th Cir. 1969) ("The ethic which permeates the American dream is that a person may advance as far as his
talents and his merits will carry him.")
58. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 235-36 (1982) (a victim of employment discrimination
needs employment to restore self-esteem).
59. See, e.g., Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970) (discrimination in employment
is one of the most deplorable forms in our society, for it deals not with the "outer benefits" of being an American citizen,
but rather with the ability to provide decently for one's family in a job or profession that he or she chooses).
60. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
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B. Enforcement Schemes
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful to discriminate in
employment on the basis of race, sex, national origin, or religion. 61 Initially, several
senators presented civil rights bills at the session of Congress that eventually enacted
Title VII. 62 The various bills proposed a range of enforcement schemes, but the
model receiving the most attention was the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB).63 The NLRB has the primary responsibility of enforcing the national policy
on labor-management relations embodied in the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA). 64 A fundamental role of the NLRB is to strike a balance between the
legitimate competing interests of labor and management in accordance with the
statutory guidelines provided in the NLRA. 65 The NLRB has both investigatory and
judicial functions and the courts have held that the NLRB is vested with considerable
discretion in establishing rules and remedies to carry out the policy of the Labor
Act. 66 The federal courts play a very limited role in the enforcement of the NLRA. 67
Although some provisions of Title VII were patterned after provisions of the
NLRA,6 s Congress ultimately decided not to adopt the NLRA enforcement model but
chose instead to establish three interrelated enforcement schemes: private suits in
federal courts by aggrieved individuals;69 an administrative agency, the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), with investigatory powers but no
enforcement authority except through "informal methods of conference, concilia-
tion, and persuasion, ' 70 and pattern and practice litigation in federal court by the
Attorney General. 7
1
The enforcement mechanisms that Congress established for the national policy
against discrimination in employment reflect the opinions of some members of Con-
gress that the final determination of what constitutes unlawful employment practices
and the relief from these practices should be made by the federal judiciary.72 The
rationale for ultimately preferring the federal judiciary to enforce Title VII was based
on the belief by some members of Congress that employers and labor unions would
thereby have a fairer forum in which to establish innocence. 73 The decision of
Congress to vest final enforcement authority in the federal courts was thus a political
61. Title VII § 703(a)(1), (a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
62. See Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 431 & 431 n.2 (1966).
63. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419 n.ll (1975).
64. See, e.g., Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
65. See, e.g., Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975); Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
66. See, e.g., Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
67. See, e.g., UAW Local 238 v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205 (1965); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474
(1951).
68. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416-17 (1975).
69. Title VII § 706(b), (f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (f)(1) (1976).
70. Id.
71. Title VII § 707, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1976).
72. H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. (1963), reprinted in 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2391 (1964).
73. Id. at 2401-08.
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decision to select one form of discretionary justice over another. It appears, therefore,
that Congress was unwilling to remit the enforcement power to effectuate the national
policy against discrimination to the form of discretionary justice administered by a
federal administrative agency.
74
C. The Interests Protected: Public and Private
The laws against discrimination in employment are designed to protect public
and private interests. The blending of these interests is found in all of the laws. The
enforcement provisions of Title VII, for example, as originally introduced in Con-
gress in 1963, were patterned after those of the NLRA. 75 The EEOC was to have
been an independent federal agency, like the NLRB, with the authority to issue cease
and desist orders.7 6 This original enforcement scheme was primarily designed to
protect the public interest in eliminating discrimination throughout the economy; the
individual right to be free from unlawful discrimination was subordinated to this
larger public interest.7 7 Title VII, as eventually enacted by Congress, however,
denied all enforcement authority to the EEOC, and the agency was left only with
informal methods of conciliation and persuasion to effectuate the broad remedial
purpose of the Act.78 Congress substituted private suits for agency enforcement of the
Act in an amendment that allowed a private plaintiff to bring an action in federal court
after the exhaustion of administrative remedies. 79 The amendment indicated an ap-
parent shift from the primary emphasis on the public interest to a dual emphasis on
the vindication of both public and private interests. 80
The modification of Title VII by Congress did not signal a subordinate role for
the vindication of a strong public interest in the enforcement scheme. The concern for
the public interest was retained in two forms. First, the EEOC, even without in-
dependent enforcement authority, was given an important, albeit limited, role in the
enforcement scheme. The EEOC was given, for example, the responsibility for the
receipt, investigation, and informal resolution of claims arising under the Act. 81 The
Commissioners could file commission charges whenever there were reasonable
grounds to believe that a violation of the Act had occurred. 82 The EEOC could appear
as amicus curiae in private civil actions and could initiate an action in federal court to
compel compliance with a court decree that had been entered in a privately initiated
civil action. 83 On a different level, the Attorney General was given authority to seek
74. See Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BRooKLYN L. REv. 62 (1964).
For a perceptive and critical discussion of the role of discretion in the administrative context, see K. DAviS, DISCRMON-
ARY JUsTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969).
75. See vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 431 (1966).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Title VII § 205(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976).
79. Title VII § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976).
80. Title VII § 706(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1976).
81. Title VII § 706(i), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(i) (1976) (compliance enforcement provision); General Counsel
Opinion Letter, December 3, 1965, First Digest 41 (1966); Commission Decision, Nov. 30, 1965, First Digest 42 (1966).
82. Title VII § 707, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1976).
83. See Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEo. WVASH. L.
REv. 824 (1972).
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preliminary relief in appropriate cases and could initiate pattern and practice84 suits
independent of the scheme for administrative action and private civil suits.
The 1972 amendments to Title VII further underscored the public interest in
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, sex, national origin, and religion by
giving the EEOC independent enforcement authority. Congress still did not give the
EEOC cease and desist powers similar to those reposed in the NLRB, but the EEOC
can now seek court enforcement through a civil action. 85 The private right of enforce-
ment was retained under the 1972 amendments in the face of the strong congressional
opposition asserting that it was no longer necessary, in light of the expanded enforce-
ment authority of the EEOC.86
The blending of the public and private interests in the elimination of employ-
ment discrimination was soon recognized in the Title VII enforcement efforts. Many
of the early Title VII cases were filed as class actions under Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 87 Although Title VII is silent on whether private enforce-
ment actions can be brought as class actions, the courts were extremely receptive to
the private class action mode of enforcement. The courts upheld the class action
mode of enforcement under several different but related theories. First, the courts
adopted the "private attorney general" theory, which holds that a private action
brought by an individual is more than a private claim by a single individual seeking to
vindicate purely private rights because "[w]hether in name or not, the suit is perforce
a sort of class action for fellow employees similarly situated." 88 The "private attor-
ney general" theory nearly eliminates the distinction between the common-law mode
of adjudication, in which the parties seek resolution of purely private rights, and the
public law mode of adjudication, which seeks vindication of public rights.89 Second,
the courts adopted an "across-the-board" ' theory under which a single individual or
84. Id.
85. See generally Belton, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Decade of Private Enforcement and Judicial
Developments, 20 ST. Louis U.L.J. 225 (1976); Belton, A Comparative Review of Public and Private Enforcement of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 VAND. L. REV. 905 (1978).
86. See generally Belton, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Decade of Private Enforcement and Judicial
Developments, 20 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 225 (1976); Belton, A Comparative Review of Public and Private Enforcement of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 VAND. L. REv. 905 (1978).
87. See Belton, A Comparative Review of Public and Private Enforcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 31 VAND. L. REv. 905, 932-34 (1978); Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 tARV. L. REV. 1318, 1325
(1976). The substantive theories of liability under Title VII and class action law under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure had a symbiotic relationship in doctrinal development: neither would be quite the same today were it
not for the other. See generally Belton, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Decade of Private Enforcement and
Judicial Developments, 20 ST. Louis U.L.J. 225 (1976).
Class actions under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976), and under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 623-634 (1976 & Supp. m]11979), are statutory class actions not subject to Rule 23. Class certification
under the Equal Pay Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act is governed by § 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standard
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (Supp. 11I 1979), which requires class members to file written consent that their claims be
included in the cases. For a discussion of some of the issues involved in class actions under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, see Note, The Class Action Suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Current Status,
Controversies, and Suggested Clarifications, 32 HAsTGs L.J. 1377 (1981).
88. Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 33 (5th Cir. 1968).
89. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1284 (1976) (employment
discrimination is one of the "avatars" of the emerging models of public law litigation). See generally Belton, A
Comparative Review of Public and Private Enforcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 VANDt. L. REV. 905
(1978).
90. The seminal case adopting the "across-the-board" class action theory in employment discrimination cases is
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969). Plaintiff in Johnson was discharged after
complaining of unlawful employment discrimination against blacks; the discharge allegedly was for absenteeism and
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a representative group of plaintiffs is allowed to represent all persons similarly situ-
ated who are affected by the defendant's discriminatory employment practices. For
example, an employee whose individual claim was based upon circumstances sur-
rounding his or her discharge could represent all individuals allegedly affected by
discriminatory practices in hiring, promotion, working conditions, and wages. 91 The
rationale for the broadly based "across-the-board" class actions was that they were
necessary to effectuate the broad remedial purposes of Title VII.92 Third, the courts
held that class actions were appropriate from a policy perspective because this mode
of adjudication promotes judicial economy, eliminates the possibility of inconsistent
and varying outcomes, and protects the defendant from the possible burden of de-
fending multiple lawsuits challenging the same policy or practice. 93
D. Statutory Relief Provisions
The scope of a court's remedial authority to redress an established violation of a
federal statute depends primarily on the terms of the statute and the character of the
violation. As a general rule, unless Congress has specifically commanded or with-
drawn a particular form of relief, the court retains the inherent equitable power to
shape appropriate relief.94 A basic model that Congress used to define the scope of a
tardiness. He then filed a Title VII class action in which he sought to represent all black employees of the company who
had been discriminated against because of race in hiring, discharge, promotion, and working conditions. The district court
limited the class to those employees who, like the plaintiff, had been discharged. The court of appeals reversed and held
that the plaintiff's case was an "'across the board' attack on unequal employment practices alleged to have been
committed by the [defendant] pursuant to its policy of racial discrimination." Id. at 1124. The court of appeals recognized
that varying questions of law and fact would arise with regard to individual class members, but held that "'the Damoclean
threat of racially discriminatory policy hangs over the racial class [as a whole and thus] is a question of fact common to all
members of the class,"' and that broad class treatment was therefore appropriate. Id. (quoting Hall v. Wertham Bag
Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184 (M.D. Tenn. 1966)). The across-the-board class action theory focuses broadly on group wrongs
and significantly altered the character of employment discrimination litigation. See Developments in the Law-
Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the CivilRights Act of 1964,84 HARv. L. Rv. 1109, 1113-19 (1971); Note,
The Class Action Device in Title VII Civil Suits, 28 S.C.L. Rav. 639 (1977).
91. See, e.g., Crockett v. Green, 534 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1976); Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976); Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1975); Long v. Sapp, 502
F.2d 34, 43 (5th Cir. 1974); Reed v. Arlington Hotel Co., 476 F.2d 721 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 854 (1973).
The continuing vitality of the across-the-board class action theory has been seriously questioned by the Supreme Court.
East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977); General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v.
Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982). See also Note, How Far Across-the-Board: The Permissible Breadth of Title VII Class
Actions, 24 ARiz. L. REv. 61 (1982).
92. See Senter v. General Motor Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 524 (6th Cir.) (court bears special responsibility to vindicate
the policies of Title VII regardless of the position of the individual plaintiff), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976); Barnett v.
W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543, 547-48 (4th Cir. 1975) (across-the-board approach consonant with the broad remedial
purposes of Title VII); Piva v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 378, 386 (N.D. Cal. 1975) ("[The Courts of Appeal, the
Congress and indeed the Supreme Court have all emphasized the importance of the broad remedial public policy of Title
VII, and.., we conclude that the effectuation of the broad public policy requires that the commonality and typicality
pre-requisites of Rule 23(a) be liberally applied in Title VII actions."), affd, 654 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1981).
Congress, in rejecting legislation which would have limited class action under Title VII, expressly approved the
across-the-board class action approach adopted in the seminal Fifth Circuit cases. S. Rep. No. 415, 92d Cong., Ist Sess.
27 ("The committee agrees with the courts that Title VII actions are by their nature class complaints and that any
restriction on such actions would greatly undermine the effectiveness of Title VII.") (citing Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach
Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1968)).
93. See, e.g., Mack v. General Electric Co., 329 F. Supp. 72, 75 (E.D. Pa. 1971). See generally, R. FiELD, B.
KAPLAN & K. CLaoMrNT, CmIL PRocEuRE 178 (4th ed. 1978); 3B MoORE's FEDERAL PRACncE § 23.01, at 23-14 to
23-34 (2d ed. 1979).
94. Weinberger v. Romero-Barelo, 456 U.S. 305, 309-10 (1982).
THE MOODY AND FRANKS STANDARDS
court's remedial authority to fashion relief in the employment discrimination cases is
found in section 706(g) of Title VII, which provides, in pertinent part:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally
engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may
enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order
such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to,
reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay.., or any other equi-
table relief as the court deems appropriate .... 95
The legislative history of section 706(g) shows that Congress did not intend to divest
the federal courts of all their traditional equitable powers to fashion appropriate relief.
The original bill provided that the court shall order appropriate relief upon a finding
of unlawful discrimination. 96 Congress changed the mandatory term "shall" to the
discretionary term "may" during the legislative debate.
The legislative history of section 706(g) also supports the proposition that the
federal courts were not to be bound by traditional notions of equitable discretion in
fashioning remedies to vindicate the public and private interests protected under Title
VII. In the 1972 amendments, Congress added the phrase "or any other equitable
relief" to ensure that the federal courts would have broad discretion to fashion
appropriate relief.
97
There is only one specific statutory limitation on the equitable discretion of the
courts under Title VII. The last sentence in section 706(g) provides that a court shall
issue no order on reinstatement, hiring preference, promotion, or back pay to any
individual who was denied an employment opportunity "for any reason other than
discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ..9.8."
The exact meaning of this limitation is not clear from the legislative history. This
sentence first appeared in the bill reported out of the original House Judiciary Com-
mittee in 1964. The bill provided that a court would not require relief for an in-
dividual who was denied an employment opportunity, if the decision was based upon
"just cause.' 99 The just cause standard, like the remainder of the original version of
706(g), was patterned on section 10(c) of the NLRA.l ° ° Congressman Celler, a
.strong supporter of Title VII, introduced an amendment to change the just cause
standard to the language presently found in section 706(g).10 1 The change clarified
95. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
96. Amendment No. 656 to H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 110 CONG. REc. I1, 930-34 (Mansfield-Dirksen
Substitute Bill).
97. The spokesman for the House and Senate conferees believed that Congress gave discretion to the courts to
foster a policy of liberal remedies and to encourage the most complete relief possible. 118 CONG. REc. 7168 (1972)
(section by section analysis of H.R. 1746). See generally Sape and Hart, Title VII Revisited: The Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 824 (1972).
98. Title VII § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
99. H.R. 7152 § 707(e), reprinted in EEOC, LEGISLAnvE HISTORY OF TrrTLES VII AND XI OF THE CIVIL RiGirs
Acr OF 1964, 2012 (1968).
100. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419 (1975); 110 CONG. REc. 6549 (remarks of Senator
Humphrey), 7214 (Clark-Case Interpretive Memorandum) (1964).
101. In introducing the amendment to what is now § 706(g), Congressman Celler stated:
Mhe purpose of the amendment is to specify cause. Here the court, for example, cannot find any violation of
the act which is based on facts other-and I emphasize "other"--thn discrimination on the grounds of race,
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Congress' intent not to require that a defendant meet a formal definition of cause so
long as that defendant could show that his or her actions were motivated by a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason.10 2
The courts have reached different results as to the proper construction of the last
sentence in section 706(g). Some courts have construed this sentence to apply only to
the substantive violation determination in stage I proceedings. Other courts have
taken the position that this sentence is applicable to the relief formulation stage.10 3 If
the employer can show that the plaintiff would have been denied the employment
opportunity even in the absence of the practice found discriminatory in the liability
determination stage, the court is precluded from granting any form of relief.10 4
V. ANALYSIS OF MOODY and FRANKS
A. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody
Moody is the first and most significant Supreme Court decision that addresses
the use of equitable discretion in the district courts to deny or otherwise limit full
relief on a finding of unlawful employment discrimination.' 0 5 Moody presented the
color, religion, or natural origin. The discharge might be based, for example, on incompetence or a morals
charge or theft, but the court can only consider charges based on race, color, religion or national origin. That is
the purpose of this amendment.
110 CONG. REC. 2567 (1964). Similarly, Congressman Gill stated that under § 706(g) as amended. "we would not
interfere with discharges for ineptness, or drunkeness. We would not interfere with unfair labor practices that are covered
under other acts. We would limit orders under this act to the purposes of this act." 110 CONo. REC. 2570 (1964).
102. See Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 431, 438 (1966).
103. See, e.g., United States v. International Union of Elevator Constructors, Local Union No. 5, 538 F.2d 1012,
1019 (3d Cir. 1976).
104. See, e.g., Day v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083, 1085-86 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Harbison v. Goldschmidt, 693 F.2d
115, 117 (10th Cir. 1982).
105. It cannot be said, however, that the issue the Court addressed in Moody was novel, except to the extent that the
Court was dealing with the question of equitable discretion in the context of a new statute. The Court had much precedent
to rely on from cases raising similar issues in analogous statutory provisions.
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944) is, perhaps, the leading case on the effect of a statute on the traditional
equitable discretion of a court. The issue in Hecht was whether the administrator of the Emergency Price Control Act was
entitled to an injunction in the face of a clear violation of the Act. The Government argued that since the statutory
provision on relief had used the operative word "shall" rather than "may" in instructing the courts on injunctive relief, it
was mandatory that the district court issue the injunction. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, rejected this
argument. In language that has been often cited on the role of equitable discretion in the context of a statutory prescription
on certain forms of conduct, the Court, backed by "several hundred years of history," said:
A grant of jurisdiction to issue compliance orders hardly suggests an absolute duty to do so under any and
all circumstances. We cannot but think that if Congress had intended to make such a drastic departure from the
traditions of equity practice, an unequivocal statement of its purpose would have been made .... The essence
of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the
necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity had distinguished it. The equities of mercy and
practicality have made equity the instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation between the public interest
and private needs as well as between competing private claims .... We do not believe that a major departure
from that long tradition as is here proposed should be lightly implied.
Id. at 329-330. Hecht established two major doctrinal principles on the relationship between equitable discretion and
statutes. The first principle is that unless Congress has explicitly mandated a particular form of relief, the courts retain
equitable discretion in choosing the form and extent of the relief that they deem appropriate to compel compliance with the
statute. Second, when a plaintiff has proven a statutory violation, the court must exercise its discretion in a fashion that
achieves compliance with the statutory purpose. For a recent and perhaps the most definitive treatment of Hecht, see
Plater, supra note 4, at 546-56.
The Court in Hecht noted the good faith efforts of the company to comply with the Act and that once the violations
were discovered, the company took vigorous steps to prevent future occurrences. Hecht thus supports the position that a
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Court with the opportunity to either confirm or modify the liberal philosophical
construction the lower courts had given to section 706(g) 1° 6 and to address the
conflicting standards that had been adopted for the various forms of unlawful dis-
crimination.
Moody, like many of the earlier Title VII cases, arose against a backdrop of open
discrimination against blacks prior to the effective date of Title VII. The defendants
were a private employer and a labor organization. Although the employer had not
completely excluded blacks from its workforce, it had a policy of limiting its black
employees to racially segregated jobs and departments. The major allegations of the
plaintiffs were that the employer's testing and educational requirements had a dis-
parate impact on the employment opportunities of the black employees and were not
justified by business necessity, and that the job seniority system adopted by the
employer and the union perpetuated the overt discriminatory practices that existed in
the employer's departmental assignments prior to the effective date of Title VII. The
plaintiffs sought broadly based injunctive relief, including back pay.
The district court found the educational requirements unlawful and enjoined the
employer from their further use, but upheld the testing practice on the ground that the
employer had validated the tests. 107 The district court also found that the job seniority
system constituted an unlawful employment practice and ordered the employer and
the union to implement a plantwide seniority system under the "rightful place"
theory of relief. 10 8 The court refused to award the plaintiffs back pay for the eco-
nomic loss they had suffered, relying on two grounds; the court found no evidence of
bad faith noncompliance with the Act,1° 9 and further reasoned that the employer
would be substantially prejudiced by an award of back pay since the plaintiffs had not
specifically requested back pay until five years after the complaint had been filed in
federal court.1 0 The court of appeals reversed the finding of the lower court on the
testing requirements and directed that an injunction be issued against their further
use. The court of appeals also reversed the denial of back pay by holding that "a
plaintiff or complaining class who is successful in obtaining an injunction under Title
VII of the Act should ordinarily be awarded back pay unless special circumstances
would render such an award unjust."" '1 The Supreme Court granted review to re-
court may properly consider a good faith defense in determining whether to grant, deny, or otherwise limit relief for a
proven statutory violation. Few courts in the employment discrimination cases directly relied on the Hecht precedent, but
a number of the courts had accepted a good faith defense as a basis on which to deny or otherwise limit full relief.
In one of the later cases, Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946), also arising under the Emergency
Price Control Act, the Court elaborated further on the role of equitable discretion in the statutory setting. The district court
had declined to exercise jurisdiction to order a restitution remedy for rents that defendant had collected in excess of the
federal regulation there at issue. The Court reversed, noting that "[r]estitution, which lies within that equitable jurisdic-
tion, is consistent with and differs greatly from the damages and penalties which may be awarded" under the statute. Id. at
402. Thus, when an enforcement proceeding seeks restitution under a statute which is designed to protect the public
interest, the petitioner is acting "in the public interest" and when a court orders restitution, it is acting "within the
recognized power and within the highest tradition of a court of equity." Id.
106. See, e.g., Asbestos Workers Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
107. 422 U.S. 405, 410 (1975).
108. Id. at 409.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 411.
111. Id. at 411-12,
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solve, inter alia, the conflict between the circuits as to the appropriate equitable
standard under which a court can deny back pay even after making a finding of
unlawful employment discrimination.
112
The petitioners in Moody-the employer and the union-advanced several argu-
ments for reversal of the court of appeals. First, the petitioners focused on the term
"may" in section 706(g) and the legislative history of the change from shall to may
to argue that Congress did not intend to deprive the federal courts of their traditional
equitable power to grant or deny relief.113 Second, the petitioners relied on a litany of
maxims that courts have used in applying equitable discretion. They noted that as a
general rule, a court of equity is not inflexibly bound to direct any particular form of
relief; a court of equity has full power to grant or withhold the particular form of relief
sought by fashioning a remedy that will best serve the ends of justice in the particular
circumstances. They went on to note that justice requires a balancing of the equities,
which, in this case, included a statute of limitation, laches, economic reality, and
physical and fiscal limitations on the court's ability to grant and supervise the
relief. 114
The Moody respondents supported the special circumstances rule on the ground,
inter alia, that it was a clear standard for the exercise of discretion and that it
provided for predictability in the law, in addition to facilitating the voluntary settle-
ments that are a preferred enforcement measure. They argued that standardless dis-
cretion would result in the abandonment of the remedial scheme to the varying and
inconsistent interpretations of hundreds of federal district court judges." 5
Ultimately, the Court did not fully accept either the petitioners' or the respon-
dents' positions. The Court, although agreeing with the court of appeals' decision on
the back pay issue, rejected the special circumstances standard with an exception for
awards of attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs in Title VII cases. 116 The Court
found it necessary to "look elsewhere"' 17 to find an appropriate standard for exercis-
ing discretion in the fashioning of relief for victims of discrimination. The Court first
looked to the statutory language Congress had chosen to define the scope of a court's
equitable discretion. Noting that Congress had deliberately chosen the term "may"
and had specifically rejected the term "shall" in section 706(g), the Court initially
determined that the statutory standard did not clearly mandate an award of back pay
even when a plaintiff or a complaining class had suffered economic injury as a result
of a proven violation. 118 The Court immediately thereafter made clear, however, that
the congressional choice of the discretionary term "may" is not a standardless or
meaningless term:
[D]iscretionary choices are not left to a court's "inclination, but to its judgment; and its
judgment is to be guided by sound legal principles" . ... The power to award backpay
112. Id. at 413.
113. Brief for the Petitioner Employer at 51-55, Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
114. Brief for Petitioner Halifax Local No. 425 at 23-24, Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
115. Brief for Respondent Moody at 43-60, Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
116. 422 U.S. 405, 415 (1975).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 415-16.
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was bestowed by Congress, as part of a complex legislative design directed at a historic
evil of national proportions. A court must exercise this power "in light of the large
objectives of the Act." . . . That the court's discretion is equitable in nature...
hardly means that it is unfettered by meaningful standards or shielded from thorough
appellate review. In Mitchell v. DeMario Jewelry, 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960), this Court
held, in the face of a silent statute, that district courts enjoyed the "historic power of
equity" to award lost wages to workmen unlawfully discriminated against under... the
Fair Labor Standards Act .... The Court simultaneously noted that "the statutory pur-
poses [leave] little room for the exercise of discretion not to order reimbursement." 9
The Court then established the doctrinal theme that it directed the lower courts to
follow in exercising discretion in the relief formulation stage:
It is true that "[e]quity eschews mechanical rules ... [and] depends on flexibility."...
But when Congress invokes the Chancellor's conscience to further transcendent legisla-
tive purposes, what is required is the principled application of standards consistent with
those purposes and not "equity [which] varies like the Chancellor's foot." Important
national goals would be frustrated by a regime of discretion that "produce[d] different
results for breaches of duty in situations that cannot be differentiated in policy .... 120
To aid the lower courts in the application of "sound legal principles" and
"principled. . .standards," the Court next identified two broad purposes behind the
enactment of Title VII. The first was a "prophylactic" purpose found in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 121 the seminal substantive Title VII case; it was to "achieve
equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the
past to favor an identifiable group of... employees over other employees." ' 122 The
second purpose was to "make persons whole" for injuries suffered because of unlaw-
ful discrimination.1 23 The make-whole theory was grounded in the historic purpose of
equity: to "secure complete justice" 124 and to afford all "necessary relief" 121 when
federal rights have been invaded.
The Court then looked to the National Labor Relations Act and the cases decided
under it, because Congress had initially relied on the NLRA, particularly the remedial
section, as a model in the drafting of Title VII. 126 The remedial sections of Title VII
and the NLRA are almost identical' 2 7 and the, Court noted that under NLRA de-
cisional law, back pay had been liberally awarded as a means of effectuating the
NLRA's twin purposes of reimbursing employees for actual losses suffered as a result
of discriminatory discharges and of furthering the public interest in deterring such
discharges. 128
After identifying the sources of analysis for the exercise of equitable discretion,
the Court then announced its fundamental holding on equitable discretion: "[G]iven a
119. Id. at 416.
120. Id. at 417 (emphasis added).
121. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
122. Id. at 429-30.
123. 422 U.S. 405, 419 (1975) (citing Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941)).
124. Id. at 418 (citing Brown v. Swann, 10 Pet. 497, 503 (1936)).
125. Id. (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
126. Id. at 419.
127. See id. at 419 n.ll, n.16.
128. Id. at 421.
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finding of unlawful employment discrimination, back pay should be denied only for
reasons which, if applied generally, would not frustrate the central statutory purposes
of eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for
injuries suffered through past discrimination."- 129 The Court underscored the im-
portance of this rule by mandating that the district courts "carefully articulate [their]
reasons" for the denial of complete justice and necessary relief. 130
The Court did not construe section 706(g) to eliminate totally all discretion
regarding relief. Thus, for example, the Court indicated that the lateness of plaintiffs'
request for back pay could be a basis on which to deny back pay despite the liberal
standard. 131 The Court remanded this issue for further consideration by the district
court to determine whether the defendants had actually been prejudiced by the late-
ness of the claim. 13
2
Viewed in the context of the inconsistent and conflicting standards enunciated
by the lower courts, Moody is significant for several reasons. First, the two-pronged
objective against which a court must exercise its equitable discretion must be viewed
as a more stringent substantive limitation on the power of the courts to deny or
otherwise limit complete relief in the employment discrimination cases than the court
has adopted in other statutory cases. In Moody, the Court read both the statutory
language in section 706(g) and the congressional purpose as establishing a public
interest standard of discretion, and not as imposing the traditional equitable standard
that derives from the common law and is appropriate for litigation between private
parties. 133 The importance of Moody cannot be completely understood, however,
without some appreciation of the development of the common-law courts, the courts
of equity, and the role discretion played in this development.' 34 Moody thus man-
dates that the traditional common-law notions of equitable discretion are in-
appropriate when the standards of the public interest measure the propriety and need
for injunctive relief. Second, the Court initiated the development of a single standard,
more fully elaborated in Franks, for the exercise of equitable discretion with respect
to all forms of relief. Thus, for example, the Court, in rejecting a good faith defense
based on the defendants' efforts to comply with Title VII, noted that the acceptance
of this defense would "open an enormous chasm between injunctive and back pay
relief" when there was nothing in the legislative history to justify the "creation of
drastic and categorical distinctions between those two remedies." 135 The good faith
defense is likely to be limited to that small class of cases in which defendants can
129. Id.
130. Id. at 421 n.14.
131. Id. at 424.
132. Id.
133. See Plater, supra note 4, and Developments in the Law--Injunctions, 78 HARv. L. REv. 994 (1965), for
discussions of the traditional common-law notion of discretion and its development as applied in a modem statutory
context.
134. No attempt has been made to treat the development of the doctrine of equitable discretion in this Article because
it has been treated adequately elsewhere. See generally Winner, The Chancellor's Foot And Environmental Law: A Call
for Better Reasoned Decisions on Environmental Injunctions, 9 ENVrL. L. 477 (1979).
135. 422 U.S. 405, 423 (1975).
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successfully assert the section 713(b) defense by showing reliance on a written
interpretation or opinion of the EEOC.136 Moody also establishes a strong presump-
tion in favor of full and complete relief. 1
3 7
Finally, the Moody standard on equitable discretion is consistent with the con-
gressional purpose to vindicate both the public and private interest for injuries caused
by unlawful employment discrimination. The public interest is protected under the
Moody standard by the Court's emphasis on the mandate to the lower courts that
denial or limitation of relief must be consistent with the congressional purpose of
eliminating discrimination throughout the economy. Relying on reasoning from the
Eighth Circuit in United States v. N.L. Industries,138 the Court held that a pre-
sumptive entitlement to back pay, in addition to injunctive relief, furthers the public
policy embodied in Title VII by providing defendants with a "spur or catalyst which
causes employers and unions to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment
practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges of an
unfortunate and ignominious page in this country's history." 139 The private interests
of victims of unlawful employment discrimination are protected under the Moody
standard by the mandate to the lower courts that the victims of unlawful employment
discrimination must be made whole because Title VII deals with legal injuries of an
economic character occasioned by racial and other antiminority discrimination.14
0
B. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.
In Franks, the Supreme Court expanded on and refined the Moody standard in
significant respects. 141 Unlike Moody, Franks involved a form of relief-retroactive
or rightful place seniority 14 2-that required the Court to balance the equities because
of the competing interests of the plaintiffs, who were found to be victims of unlawful
employment discrimination; the employer, whose employment practices were found
to have been unlawful; the union, who, with the employer, was a signatory to the
seniority provision in the collective bargaining agreement; and white employees,
whose employment expectancies would be affected by the award of complete justice
and necessary relief under the Moody standard.
The district court found that the employer had discriminated against the plain-
tiffs' class by refusing to hire them at an earlier date because of race. Plaintiffs were
subsequently employed but were given a seniority date as of the original date of hire
rather than the seniority status they would have had if they had not been wrongfully
denied employment earlier. The district court refused to award the plaintiffs con-
structive seniority under the rightful place theory of relief on the ground that the
136. Id. at 422-23 & n.17.
137. Id. at 420 n.12 (citing NLRB v. Mastro Plastics Corp., 354 F.2d 170, 178 (2d Cir. 1965)).
138. 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973).
139. 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975).
140. Id. at 418.
141. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
142. "Retroactive seniority" is the equivalent of "rightful place." See Asbestos Workers Local 53 v. Vogler, 407
F.2d 1047, 1052-53 (5th Cir. 1969).
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seniority system was not unlawful on its face or as applied to these plaintiffs. The
court of appeals affirmed the denial of seniority relief.143
Two important questions were raised in Franks. The first was whether the
Moody standard on equitable discretion applied only to relief in the form of back pay.
The second was whether the Moody standard on back pay, in which only the interests
of the plaintiffs and defendants were at stake, applied to a different form of relief
when the employment expectancies of innocent third parties 14 4 would be adversely
affected. The back pay form of relief in Moody could be awarded without considera-
tion of the impact on the employment expectancies of other employees because only
the defendants' interests were at stake. As a threshold matter, the Court in Franks
rejected the Fifth Circuit's view that section 703(h),' 45 which protects bona fide
seniority systems, limits the remedial authority of the courts under section 706(g).
The Court noted that the bona fides of the seniority system were not at issue and the
relief the plaintiffs sought would not result in a modification or elimination of the
extant system. 1
46
On the question of the reach of the Moody standard of discretion, Franks
emphatically rejected the argument that Moody is limited to relief in the form of back
pay and held that all forms of relief are to be governed by an equitable discretion rule
of complete relief:
We begin by repeating the observation of earlier decisions that in enacting Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress intended to prohibit all practices in whatever
form which create inequality in employment opportunity due to discrimination on the
basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin ... and ordained that its policy of outlaw-
ing such discrimination should have the "highest priority" ...... Last Term's Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody . . ., consistently with the congressional plan, held that one of the
central purposes of Title VII is "to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of
unlawful employment discrimination.""147
The Court found the application of the Moody equitable discretion standard to all
forms of relief supported by Congress' "emphatic confirmation" in the 1972 amend-
ments to Title VII.' 4 8
Franks found no principled reason to distinguish between the various forms of
relief, to give one a greater preference, or to select from among them, if all forms of
relief were necessary to effectuate the congressional purpose. Thus, for example, the
Court held that adequate relief may well be denied in the absence of a seniority
remedy slotting the victim of employment discrimination into the position he would
have had but for the unlawful employment practices of the defendants. 149
The dissenters in Franks agreed with the general proposition that the Moody
equitable discretion standard applies to all forms of relief, but believed that a court
143. 424 U.S. 747, 753 (1976).
144. See id. at 788 (Powell, J., dissenting).
145. Title VII § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
146. 424 U.S. 747, 758 (1976).
147. Id. at 763 (emphasis added).
148. Id. at 764.
149. Id. at 764-65.
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should have flexibility to decide to give alternative relief in the form of back pay or
front pay rather than the more complete relief of a seniority adjustment.15 ° The
Franks majority clearly rejected this reading of Moody:
[Tihe issue of seniority relief cuts to the very heart of Title VII's primary objective of
eradicating present and future discrimination in a way that backpay, for example, can
never do. "[S]eniority, after all, is a right which a worker exercises in each job movement
in the future, rather than a simple one-time payment for the past."' 5' 1
The Franks Court expanded the Moody standard by construing the term
"affirmative action" in section 706(g). Affirmative action is designed to "recreate
the conditions and relationships" that would have been created or established but for
the unlawful employment discrimination.' 5 2 Although the Court relied on NLRA
precedent in support of its interpretation, the Court also held that the federal courts in
Title VII cases have broader discretion than the NLRB has under a similar provision
of the NLRA.1
53
Having established that the Moody standard applies to all forms of relief, the
Court then addressed the question of the potential reach of a district court's discre-
tion. This question was raised by the defendants' argument that a court is obligated to
balance the interests of the employment expectancies of innocent third parties
154
who, in this case, apparently were the white male employees who obtained a seniority
advantage over some of the plaintiffs only because of the discriminatory hiring
practices of the employer. 155 This question had been repeatedly raised in the lower
courts, but with conflicting results. ' 56 The issue was raised in its most troubling form
in the quota cases because of the theoretical conflict that has been suggested to exist
between the concepts of affirmative action and reverse discrimination.' 57 Implicit
also in this argument is the legality of the "bumping" remedy under which a plaintiff
who has been denied a position because of impermissible discrimination asks the
court to displace the incumbent employee. 158 On another level, this argument raises
problems of identifying the interests affected and defining the scale on which they
should be weighed under a balancing of the equities approach. On the question of
identifying the interests, the majority declared:
[W]e find untenable the conclusion that this form of relief [retroactive or rightful place
seniority] may be denied merely because the interests of other employees may thereby be
affected. "If relief under Tile VII can be denied merely because the majority group of
150. Id. at 793-94 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
151. Id. at 768 n.28 (citing Poplin, Fair Employment in a Depressed Economy: The Layoff Problem, 23 U.C.L.A.
L. Ray. 177, 225 (1975)).
152. 424 U.S. 747, 769 (1976).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 773-79.
155. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
156. See generally Belton, Discrimination and Affirmative Action: An Analysis of Competing Theories of Equality
and Weber, 59 N.C.L. REv. 531 (1981).
157. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Watkins v. United Steelworkers,
Local 2369, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975).
158. Local 189, United Papermakers and Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 988 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
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employees, who have not suffered discrimination, will be unhappy about it, there will be
little hope of correcting the wrongs to which the Act is directed."' 59
Thus, the bare fact that other employees may be unhappy about the loss of employ-
ment expectancies simply is not an interest worthy of placing in the calculus and a
court should not entertain evidence on this. Under the United Steelworkers of Amer-
ica v. Weber 160 decision, a court would be justified in weighing the legitimate
employment expectancies of the majority group employees, but it appears that those
legitimate expectancies must not have been obtained as a result of unlawful dis-
crimination by the defendant. 161 If, however, the employment expectancies of inno-
cent employees were gained as a result of unlawful employment discrimination by the
defendant, Franks held that "a sharing of the burden of past discrimination is pre-
sumptively necessary-[and this sharing] is entirely consistent with any fair
characterization of equity jurisdiction .... 162 In essence, the Court appears to be
saying that in employment discrimination, there are no innocent victims because no
employee has a vested right in his or her employment status when the continued
exercise of that right is antithetical to the strong public policy manifested in Title
VII. 163
The majority and the dissenters, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Powell, disagreed
on whether the Moody make-whole standard, as construed in Franks, significantly
stripped the district courts of their inherent equitable powers to deny or otherwise
limit complete relief in its various forms on a finding of unlawful employment
discrimination. Mr. Justice Powell was of the opinion, for several reasons, that
Franks, under the majority's construction of Moody had, "to a significant extent,"
stripped the district courts of this power. 164 First, Justice Powell believed that nothing
in either the plain language of section 706(g) or the 1972 amendments to this section
"suggest[s] that rectifying economic losses from past wrongs requires the district
courts to disregard normal equitable considerations."' 165 Second, he asserted that
under normal equitable considerations, 166 innocent third parties have a greater claim
to the chancellor's conscience than victims of illegal employment discrimination. 167
Even though Justice Powell had to admit that the form of relief at issue in Franks
"arguably furthers one of the objectives of Title VII," 168 the make-whole purpose,
he was unwilling to deprive the district courts of their inherent equitable power to
decide how the scarce and limited economic advantages of employment opportunities
should be allocated between victims of illegal employment discrimination and the
innocent third-party 169 employees or applicants. Under Justice Powell's analysis, the
159. 424 U.S. 747, 775 (1976).
160. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
161. Id. at 209.
162. 424 U.S. 747, 777 (1976).
163. See id. at 770, referring to the need to formulate relief to effectuate the national policy against discrimination
and noting the public interest protected under the laws against discrimination.
164. Id. at 786 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
165. Id. at 785.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 789.
168. Id. at 787.
169. Id. at 788.
[Vol. 44:571
THE MOODY AND FRANKS STANDARDS
make-whole purpose of Title VII could be accommodated by awarding the victims of
illegal discrimination back pay since "backpay is a remedy central to achieving the
purposes of the Act," 7 but leaving the innocent third party with the employment
opportunity.
The majority disagreed with Justice Powell's criticism by affirmatively stating
that the Franks presumption of entitlement to complete relief in all forms comports
with the notion that any fair characterization of equity jurisdiction allows for "nice
adjustment" of public and private interests' 7 1 on the basis of "what is necessary,
what is fair, and what is workable."1 72 The majority further noted that the form of
relief at issue in Franks could hardly be the kind of complete relief that Moody
demands because even with retroactive seniority, the plaintiffs would not truly be
restored to the actual seniority they would have had but for the unlawful employment
practices of the defendants. 173
The disagreement between the majority and Justice Powell on the reach of the
Moody standard turns on a balancing of the equities between private and public
interests on the one hand, and purely private interests on the other. Both the majority
and the dissenters agree that a balancing of the equities is not a sine qua non where
the form of relief is monetary or deals only with relief for past discrimination. 174 The
only interests at stake in these forms of relief are the public interest, the financial
concerns of the defendants, and the loss of past income earning potential of the
plaintiffs. The public interest in eradicating discrimination throughout the economy
and making the plaintiff whole through back pay would clearly outweigh the interest
of the defendants in their pocketbooks. The majority, unlike Justice Powell, tips the
balance of equities in favor of the victims of illegal employment discrimination to
locate just results, 75 unless it can be shown that circumstances peculiar to the
particular case 176 suggest that the balance be tipped in favor of the innocent third
party.
The majority clearly stated how the balance should be struck between complete
relief for the victims of employment discrimination and the innocent victims:
[O]ur holding is that in exercising their equitable powers, district courts should take as
their starting point the presumption in favor of rightful-place seniority relief, and proceed
with further legal analysis from that point; and that such relief may not be denied on the
abstract basis of adverse impact upon interests of other employees but rather only on the
basis of unusual adverse impact arising from facts and circumstances that generally would
not be found in Title VII cases. 1
77
The Court thus clarified the "facts and circumstances peculiar to particular cases"
language in Moody; a district court is justified in denying or limiting complete relief
170. Id. at 783.
171. Id. at 777 n.39.
172. Id..
173. Id. at 776-77.
174. Id. at 773 (weighing competing interests), 790 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("consider and weigh competing
equities").
175. 422 U.S. 405, 424-25 (1975).
176. 424 U.S. 747, 770-71 (1976).
177. Id. at 779 n.41. The concept of unusual adverse impact is intended to be equivalent to the unusual circum-
stances doctrine.
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only in those cases in which the defendant can prove unusual circumstances in the
particular case, and the court must carefully articulate those circumstances.1 78 Gener-
alizations, unwarranted assumptions, or circumstances that are inherent in any Title
VII litigation are insufficient to deny complete relief. Franks can be read as adopting
an unusual circumstances doctrine as the primary, if not the only, basis on which a
court may deny or otherwise limit complete relief by selecting from the vast array of
available relief.
C. Moody and Franks Successors
The Court returned to the problem of equitable discretion in the employment
discrimination cases in City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v.
Manhart7 9 and Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC. 180 The defendant in Manhart required its
female employees to make larger monthly contributions than its male employees to a
178. Id.
179. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
180. 458 U.S. 219 (1982).
The Court considered the application of the Moody and Franks equitable discretion in several other cases in which it
either refined or clarified the scope of a court's discretion on a finding of unlawful employment discrimination. In-
ternational Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), dealt with the question whether a district court
abuses its discretion if it adopts a per se rule that bars relief to potential victims of discrimination who claim that they did
not apply or otherwise seek an employment opportunity with a defendant because of the existence of an unlawful
employment policy or practice. The Court had left this question open in Franks. Id. at 363. The Court rejected the
application of a per se rule to the claim of a person allegedly discriminated against:
The denial of Title VII relief on the ground that the claimant had not formally applied for the job could
exclude from the Act's coverage the victims of the most entrenched forms of discrimination. Victims of gross
and pervasive discrimination could be denied relief precisely because the unlawful practices had been so
successful as totally to deter job applications from members of [the protected class]. A per se prohibition of
relief to nonapplicants could thus put beyond the reach of equity the most invidious effects of employment
discrimination-those that extend to the very hope of self-realization. Such a per se limitation on the equitable
powers granted to the courts by Title VII would be manifestly inconsistent with the "historic purpose of equity
to 'secur[e] complete justice'" and with the duty of the courts in the Title VII cases "to render a decree which
will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past."
Id. at 367 (citing Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975)).
Teamsters thus adopted the futile acts doctrine that the lower courts had enunciated in similar cases. See, e.g.,
Hairston v. McLean Trucking Co., 520 F.2d 226, 231-33 (4thCir. 1975); Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441,
451 (5th Cir. 1973). See also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977) (noting that an applicant or employee
could recognize the futility of seeking an employment opportunity and the effect of this recognition on the relevant
statistical evidence regarding the issue of liability in stage I). Although Teamsters held that the nonapplicant has the
benefit of the Franks presumption of entitlement to complete relief in stage II if he can show that he was deterred from
seeking employment, 431 U.S. 324, 367-68 (1977), the Court noted also that this threshold showing by the claimant will
be a "difficult task." Id. at 364.
Teamsters also reaffirmed the need for the district courts to attempt to reconstruct the history of conditions and
relationships of the claimant to the employer and nonvictim employees as a predicate to the application of the balancing of
the equities principle. Id. at 371-72.
The Court considered the question of seniority relief in Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982).
The Court considered and rejected three arguments advanced by the union petitioner. First, the Court held that the failure
of every class member to have the administrative remedies before the EEOC does not preclude an award of seniority relief
to nonexhausting class members as long as the representative plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies. The
Court thus treated the issue in the text in Zipes whereas it had dealt with the same issue in a footnote in Moody. Id. at 392.
Second, the Court rejected the union's argument that a subclass had not been found to be the subject of unlawful
employment discrimination. Id. at 393. Finally, the Court rejected the union's argument that the district court had abused
its discretion by awarding seniority relief based on a collective bargaining agreement when the union signatory to the
agreement had not been found to have violated Title VII. Relying on Teamsters, the Court held that a finding of
discrimination against the employer is an adequate basis on which to award seniority relief even if there is no finding that
the union has also been found guilty of discrimination. Id. at 394.
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pension plan. The contributions were withheld from their paychecks and as a result
the female employees took home less pay than similarly situated male employees
earning the same salary. On retirement, however, males and females of the same age,
seniority standing, and salary, received equal monthly benefits, despite the disparity
in contribution rates. The district court found that the contribution differential vio-
lated the female plaintiffs' rights under Title VII, issued an injunction against de-
fendant's reliance on sex-based actuarial tables, and ordered the defendant to refund
the excess contributions.' 8" The court of appeals affirmed.
182
The Supreme Court upheld the finding of liability, but reversed on the form of
relief granted. The Court noted that the Moody presumption of retroactive liability
can seldom be overcome, 183 but based its reversal on two grounds. First, the Court
apparently was willing to judicially notice that conscious and intelligent pension plan
administrators may have assumed that sex-based actuarial tables were entirely lawful
under Title VII because of the absence of prior rulings on this subject and because of
the conflicting views of federal administrative agencies. 184 Second, the Court
reasoned that relief in the form of back pay would have a substantial adverse effect on
the economic well-being of the insurance and pension plan industry and an award of
back pay on the facts of the case would be harmful to the nation generally. 185
It is possible to argue that the denial of back pay in Manhart is contradictory to
the Moody and Franks holdings. In Moody, the Court held that the clearly erroneous
standard of review should be used by the appellate courts to determine whether the
trial court abused its discretion in denying back pay. 186 In Manhart, however, the
Court failed to apply the clearly erroneous rule but relied instead on a standard of
"insufficient attention"' 8 to the equitable nature of Title VII remedies. Moody also
involved a question of first impression on the proper validation of employment tests.
After deciding this question, the Court remanded the testing issue to the trial court for
further consideration in light of the newly enunciated legal rule.' 8 8 In Manhart,
however, which also involved a question of first impression, the Court decided the
remedial question rather than remand the issue to the district court. The unusual
circumstances rule of Franks requires consideration of only those unusual circum-
stances in the facts of a particular case to provide a reason for denying a particular
form of relief.189 The defendant in Manhart had not asserted that it would suffer
economic hardship if it were required to comply with the district court's back pay
order.' 9° Rather than focus on the particular circumstances in Manhart, the Court
181. 435 U.S. 702, 706 (1978).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 719.
184. Id. at 719-20.
185. Id. at 721.
186. 422 U.S. 405, 424 (1975).
187. 435 U.S. 702, 719 (1978). The Court noted, however, that Moody is still good law and that Manhart did not
qualify the presumption in favor of retroactive relief. Id. at 723.
188. 422 U.S. 405, 436 (1975).
189. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
190. 435 U.S. 702, 722 & n.42 (1978).
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chose instead to focus on the impact on the larger community-the insurance and
pension plan community.
It is also possible to argue that Manhart is consistent with Moody and Franks.
Moody recognized that a particular form of relief could be denied if that denial would
not defeat the congressional purpose of eradicating discrimination throughout the
economy.' 9 ' The Court, in Manhart, found no reason to believe that the threat of
back pay was needed to act as a spur or catalyst to cause other defendants with similar
sex-based pension programs to reform their practices to comply with its decision on
the substantive violation.192 It is possible also to rationalize the results in Manhart by
observing that it is sometimes the practice of the Court to decide a new legal issue
narrowly, leaving to lower courts the responsibility of fleshing out its ruling in the
context of specific cases. 193 Manhart may be viewed additionally as an illustration of
the level of unusualness that must be found before the court is justified in denying a
particular form of make-whole relief. However one reads Manhart on the relief
question, whether as consistent or inconsistent with Moody and Franks, the important
principle that Manhart confirms is that a finding of unlawful employment discrimina-
tion carries with it a strong presumption of entitlement to full and complete make-
whole relief and that, unless a court finds unusual circumstances in the particular
case, a court abuses its discretion if it denies or otherwise limits full redress.
The plaintiffs in Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC194 had been denied employment
because of their sex. Subsequent to the denial, the defendant offered the plaintiffs
employment, but did not offer the seniority the plantiffs would have had but for the
earlier discriminatory denial of employment. The plaintiffs refused the offer on the
grounds that the defendant should have included the lost seniority status as well. The
plaintiffs prevailed on the substantive merits of their claim in stage I proceedings
brought by the EEOC, but in stage R proceedings the district court limited the back
pay to the period between the original denial of employment and the rejection by the
plaintiffs of defendant's offer.' 95 The court of appeals reversed, relying on the Moody
standards. 196 The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals.
The issue in Ford Motor was whether an employer who has engaged in unlawful
employment discrimination in hiring can toll the continuing accrual of back pay by
unconditionally offering the plaintiff the job previously denied without including all
the make-whole relief to which the plaintiff may be entitled. 19 The Court answered
this question in the affirmative. First, the Court found that a rule tolling the accrual of
191. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
192. 435 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1978).
193. See, e.g., County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981) (Court construes the relationship between
the Bennett Amendment under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976), and the Equal Pay Act); International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 362-71 (1977) (holding that nonapplicants may be entitled to relief under Title
VII and remanding for further consideration by the district court); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 436
(1975) (Court pronounces new guidelines on test validation and remands to the district court for further consideration in
light of the new guidelines).
194. 458 U.S. 219 (1982).
195. Id. at 3061.
196. EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 645 F.2d 183, 190 (4th Cir. 1981).
197. 458 U.S. 219, 220 (1982).
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back pay after an offer of employment has been made serves the goal of ending
discrimination throughout the economy because it encourages a victim of discrimina-
tion to minimize his or her damages under the duty to mitigate rule found also in
section 706(g). 9 Second, the Court reasoned that the rule is consistent with the
Moody make-whole rule because it encourages the plaintiff to end the potential ill
effects of the defendant's refusal to hire and does not make the employer the insurer
of the eventual unemployment of the plaintiff.' 99 Finally, the Court supported the
rule on the ground that it protects the innocent third party against eventual displace-
ment in his or her job because of a claim that might not be established by the plaintiff
at trial. 200
Like Manhart, it is possible to read Ford Motor in several ways. First, the case
may be construed as a substantial refinement of the Moody equitable discretion
standard: a plaintiff who refuses to accept an unconditional offer of employment from
a discriminating defendant, even when the offer fails to satisfy the Moody make-
whole principle, has failed, as a matter of law, to suffer economic injury that should
be redressed under section 706(g). It is also possible to read the case as involving a
failure to mitigate damages and that the court has, as in Manhart, articulated a
defense to a particular form of relief.
Perhaps the more meaningful way to read Ford Motor is to limit its application
to the duty to mitigate damages rule because the Court, relying on NLRB precedents,
noted that the duty to mitigate damages does not require a victim of hiring or
discharge discrimination to seek employment that is not consonant with his or her
particular skills, background, and experience or that imposes conditions that are
substantially more onerous than the employment opportunity in question.201 The jobs
in Ford Motor were quite similar z.20  Any other reading of this case would be in-
consistent with Moody and Franks, and the Court in Ford Motor emphatically reaf-
firmed the standard of equitable discretion established in Moody.203 Arguably, the
status of the plaintiffs in Ford Motor was analogous to the status of the rejected
applicants in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 20 4 but the
Court in Teamsters did not have to reach the question that it examined in Ford Motor.
The concern for innocent victims was again raised in Ford Motor 20 but the
Court did not attempt to consider adequately what interests of the innocent victims
198. Id. at 230, 236.
199. Id. at 234. The Court also expressed concern that the rights of "innocent employers" might be adversely
affected by any other rule because if the plaintiffs were not ultimately successful on the merits but had been offered full
relief prior to a judicial determination of liability, the "innocent employer" would have no recourse against the plaintiff
for cost of the retroactive seniority that the plaintiff erroneously received. Id. at 240 n.29.
200. Id. at 239-40.
201. Id. at 231 n.16.
202. Id. at 221. The Ford Motor job was as a "picker-packer"; the job at the General Motors warehouse was as a
warehouseman.
203. Id. at 226-27.
204. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
205. Without attempting to define who is an innocent employee, the Court simply noted that the rule adopted by the
lower court places a particularly onerous burden on the employer's innocent employees, and the rule adopted by the lower
court may require the innocent employee to yield his or her seniority to a person who has not proved and may never prove
unlawful discrimination. 458 U.S. 219, 239 (1982).
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should be considered or the weight that should be given to these interests under the
notion of balancing the equities. The opinion suggests, however, that when a plaintiff
has failed to mitigate damages, the interests of the innocent victim might outweigh
the interests of the plaintiff, but only in cases in which the form of relief is back
pay. 20 6 Since the question was not raised on the facts of the case, the Court did not
consider the competing interests of the plaintiff and the innocent victims and their
possible effects on other forms of relief.
V. THE MooDY-FRANKs Guidelines
Moody and Franks mandated that the lower courts apply sound legal principles
in exercising their equitable discretion in the choice of forms of relief for established
claims of unlawful employment discrimination, and abhored the granting of relief
that is based on "standardless discretion" or is granted only when a court finds a
defendant's violation "peculiarly deliberate, egregious, or inexcusable.''207 Unlike
some cases in which the Court decides a new legal issue narrowly but leaves to the
lower courts the responsibility of fleshing out its ruling in the context of specific
cases, the analysis of Moody and Franks establishes some clear guidelines for a
principled application of equitable discretion on matters of relief for proven claims of
unlawful discrimination. Although the Court did not attempt to be exhaustive in the
guidelines that it established, the guidelines should inform courts how discretion
should be applied to all forms of relief not specifically dealt with in Moody, Franks,
Manhart, and Ford Motor. This section will specify those guidelines; a clear un-
derstanding of them will inform the parties and the courts of the approach to relief in




Perhaps the most fundamental guideline that emerges from Moody and Franks is
that a principled application of equitable discretion, even in its historic setting, is to
"secur[e] complete justice" and to grant "necessary relief.' '208 In the context of
federally protected rights under the laws against employment discrimination, the
lower courts have not only the power but the duty to render a decree that will, so far
as possible, remedy past discrimination as well as bar similar discrimination in the
future. 20 9 The first principle that emerges, then, is that plaintiffs who have prevailed
in stage I have the benefit of a strong presumption of entitlement to all forms of
complete make-whole relief. Under this presumption, a court must, in the first step of
analysis in stage II proceedings, undertake to reconstruct the past to determine what
the terms, conditions, and privileges of employment were and what the relationship
206. See id. at 3070 (If a claimant fails to prevail on the merits, and an innocent employee has been displaced, the
innocent employee would have no recourse for the wrong done to him or her.)
207. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 420 (1975).
208. Id. at 418.
209. Id. (citing Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965)).
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of the plaintiff to the defendant and other employees (or applicants) would have been
but for the unlawful discrimination. This can be called the reconstructed history step
in the analysis and it is not limited to back pay claims.
210
The process of attempting to reconstruct the past will not be an easy undertaking
because the courts will have to consider not only what the terms and conditions of
employment might have been for the victims of unlawful discrimination, but also
what the terms, conditions, and relationships might have been for the nonvictims.
Although the process of creating the past will necessarily involve a degree of
approximation and imprecision, 21  any initial uncertainty should be resolved against
the defendant and the innocent nonvictim because of the presumptive entitlement to
complete relief. The courts have regularly applied the uncertainty rule against de-
fendants on the back pay form of relief,2 12 but have not been consistent in applying
this rule to other forms of relief. 2 13 Moreover, Moody and Franks also support the
position that the defendant should not unduly influence the decision maker as to what
the reconstructed history should be because this would give the defendant an opportu-
nity effectively to reopen the issue of discrimination that was determined in stage I.
Giving the defendant this opportunity is like sending the fox into the henhouse to
fetch the chicken.214
The presumptive entitlement principle appears to be at odds with the presump-
tion that most of the lower courts have adopted against the bumping of in-
cumbents.215 Under the lower court rule, an incumbent who occupies a position is,
210. The Supreme Court approved of the reconstructed history approach in International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 371-72 (1977), in the context of relief for nonapplicants and seniority relief.
211. Id. at 372 ("After the victims have been identified, the court must, as nearly as possible, 'recreate the
conditions and relationships that would have been had there been no' unlawful discrimination. Franks, 424 U.S. at 769.
This process of recreating the past will necessarily involve a degree of approximation and imprecision.") The determina-
tion of what the relationships and conditions would have been is a factual question to be decided by the trial court. 431
U.S. 324, 371 n.58 (1977).
212. See, e.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 260-61 (5th Cir. 1974). The Fifth Circuit
articulated two principles concerning the computation of back pay that other courts have generally followed: Unrealistic
exactitude is not required and all doubts about ascertaining the exact amount of back pay are to be resolved against the
defendant. Petway followed the Fifth Circuit's decision in Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th
Cir. 1974), in which the court held, relying on NLRA cases, that all doubt about computation must be resolved in favor of
the back pay claimant.
213. Compare the cases cited supra note 212, with, e.g., EEOC v. Kallir, Philips, Ross, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 919
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), affd without opinion, 559 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920 (1977).
214. The Supreme Court, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971), used a similar analogy, relying
on one of Aesop's fables, in describing the adverse impact of a test that has not been shown to be job related: "Congress
has now provided that tests or criteria for employment or promotion may not provide equality of opportunity merely in the
sense of the fabled offer of milk to the stork and the fox. Congress has now required ... that the vessel in which the milk
is proffered be one all seekers can use."
215. See, e.g., Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980); Harper v. General Grocers Co., 590 F.2d 713
(8th Cir. 1979) (immediate reinstatement would be the most complete relief, but immediate reinstatement would be denied
where such relief would displace another employee); Sledge v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 585 F.2d 625 (4th Cir. 1978)
(allowing victims of discrimination to bump employees with less seniority to avoid layoffs would penalize innocent
victims); Reed v. Arlington Hotel Co., 476 F.2d 721, 726 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 854 (1973); Local 189,
United Papermakers and Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 988 (5th Cir. 1969) (the rightful place theory of
relief does not require that incumbents be bumped out of their present positions), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
Accord, Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., No. 82-2048, slip op. at 15 (4th Cir. Sept. 1, 1983) ("Mhe district court's
authority in preparing a scheme whereby relief will be provided to injured employees does not, in the first instance, extend
to ordering the displacement or bumping of injured employees.") But see Sebastian v. Texas Dep't of Corrections, 541 F.
Supp. 970, 978 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (female employee entitled to be reinstated, and if plaintiff can not be otherwise
accommodated, the male incumbent must be displaced).
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under the reconstructed history analysis, given a preference to remain in the position
over the plaintiff who has been found to have been a victim of unlawful employment
discrimination. In these cases, the courts generally have awarded the plaintiffs front
pay to compensate for any economic loss between the back pay award and the future
date the plaintiff obtains his or her rightful place. 216 The presumption against bump-
ing may be justified if it can be demonstrated that most of the jobs in question are
fungible and that performance in one position does not necessarily provide training
for consideration for another position, or that the learning time for a new position is
relatively short.217 The presumption against bumping for the upper level jobs,2 18
however, fails to take into account the plaintiffs interests in professional pride,
professional development, opportunities, and professional dialogue 19 that are likely
to be impaired when the plaintiff must suffer a substantial delay in reaching his or her
rightful place.
2. Application to All Forms of Relief
The apparent distinction that some courts make between the various forms of
relief (for example, between monetary compensation in the form of front pay and
reinstatement), 2 is not justified under the make-whole theory of relief. Franks is
emphatic confirmation that the Moody make-whole theory applies to all forms of
relief that may be necessary to do complete justice. Additionally, Franks affirma-
tively states that the public interest in eliminating discrimination throughout the
economy is not served by preferring back pay,22 1 and, by implication, front pay as
well, over the rightful place form of relief.
3. A Presumption Seldom Overcome
Nothwithstanding the denial of back pay relief, Manhart establishes that the
Moody presumption in favor of complete make-whole relief is seldom overcome. To
overcome the presumption, a defendant must prove unusual circumstances peculiar to
216. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1980); EEOC v. Kallir, Philips, Ross,
Inc., 420 F. Supp. 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), affd without opinion, 559 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920
(1977).
217. See, e.g., James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977).
218. The reluctance of the courts to regularly apply to the upper level jobs such as professional, managerial, and
technical positions, the same substantive standards that the courts have enunciated and applied in the lower level skilled
and unskilled positions, has been the subject of critical commentary. See, e.g., Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs
in High Places, 95 HARv. L. REV. 947 (1982); Friedman, Congress, the Courts, and Sex-Based Employment Discrimina-
tion in Higher Education: A Tale of Two Titles, 34 V.AD. L. Rav. 37 (1981); Waintroob, The Developing Law of Equal
Employment Opportunity at the White Collar and Professional Level, 21 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 45 (1979); Note, Title VII
and Employment Discrimination in "'Upper Level" Jobs, 73 COLuM. L. Rev. 1614 (1973). It appears that the courts have
been equally hesitant to order full relief in the upper level jobs even when there has been a finding of unlawful
employment discrimination. This tendency is most evident in the reinstatement cases.
219. See, e.g., Crawley v. Board of Educ. of Marion County, 658 F.2d 450, 452 (6th Cir. 1981) (court takes
judicial notice that principals and teachers take great pride in their professional status); Gibson v. United States Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service, 541 F. Supp. 131, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (loss of professional status not capable of
monetary calculation).
220. For example, back pay is not subject to the balancing of the equities, but the court balances the equities in the
reinstatement cases.
221. 424 U.S. 747, 768 n.28 (1976).
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the particular case. It appears that the special circumstances rule that the lower courts
had adopted for some forms of relief is not as stringent as the unusual circumstances
rule that Moody and Franks adopt. Moody retained the special circumstances rule
only for awards of fees in the employment discrimination cases. A review of the
lower court decisions on the application of the special circumstances rule in the fee
award cases suggests, however, that the presumption of entitlement to fees for a
prevailing plaintiff is seldom overcome. 222 Moreover, the courts have broadly de-
fined fees to include the full range of economic items properly attributable to the
services of an attorney. 223 The discretion of the court in stage II proceedings should
be exercised in a similar fashion for the victims of discrimination under the unusual
circumstances doctrine.
B. Irrelevancy of Irreparable Injury and Adequacy of Legal Relief
The Supreme Court has held that a congressional grant of jurisdiction to the
federal courts to insure compliance with a federal statute through injunctive relief
does not limit a court's inherent equitable power. 224 The basis for injunctive relief has
always been irreparable injury and inadequacy of legal relief.225 In Weinberger v.
222. See, e.g., Maer v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980); Northcross v. Board of Educ. of Memphis City Schools, 611
F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980); Price v. Pelka, 690 F.2d 98, 100 (6th Cir. 1982); Nadeau v.
Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275 (lst Cir. 1978).
223. See, e.g., Northcross v. Board of Educ. of Memphis City Schools, 611 F.2d 624. 636-40 (6th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980).
224. Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 701 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1983); Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d
1181 (1lth Cir. 1983).
225. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944). The discussion of irreparable injury and inadequacy of remedies at
law in the American cases can be traced back to Chancellor Kent's opinion in Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns Ch. 315 (N.Y. ch.
1823). 0. Fiss, IiUNcJtONS 13 (1972). The requirements of irreparable injury and inadequacy of legal remedies must
btill be met when an employment discrimination claimant seeks a preliminary injunction pursuant to Rule 65, FED. R. Civ.
P. See, e.g., EEOC v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 666 F.2d 1037 (6th Cir. 1981). The courts are divided, however, on
whether a district court has jurisdiction to entertain a motion for preliminary relief, to maintain a motion for preliminary
relief, or to maintain the status quo of the parties prior to exhaustion of administrative remedies. Compare, e.g., Berg v.
Richmond Unified School Dist., 528 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1975) (court has jurisdiction), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 434 U.S. 158 (1977); Drew v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 480 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1973) with. e.g., McGee v.
Purolator Courier Corp., 430 F. Supp. 1285 (N.D. Ala. 1977); Jerome v. Viviano Food Co., 489 F.2d 965 (6th Cir. 1974)
(expressing doubt about jurisdiction).
Much of the unsettled state of the law on preliminary injunctions is traceable to the Supreme Court's decision in
Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61 (1974), in which the Court held that a strong showing of irreparable injury is required
prior to the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Sampson held also that the temporary loss of income, ultimately to be
recovered, does not constitute irreparable injury. Id. at 90. The Court reached the same result on the allegation of damage
to reputation. Id. at 91. The Court recognized, however, that "cases may arise in which the circumstances surrounding an
employee's discharge, together with the resultant effect on the employee, may so far depart from the normal situation that
irreparable injury might be found." But the Court emphasized that "insufficiency of savings or difficulties in immediately
obtaining other employment-external factors common to most discharged employees and not attributable to any unusual
actions relating to the discharge itself-will not support a finding of irreparable injury, however severely they may affect a
particular individual." Id. at 92 n.68. Thus, under Sampson, the issuance of preliminary relief is reserved for the
"genuinely extraordinary situation." Id.
The lower courts have recognized the harshness of the Sampson rule and have begun to identify the widespread nature
of the manifestations of injuries caused by discriminatory discharges that qualify these cases as meeting the "genuinely
extraordinary situation" rule. See, e.g., Morrow v. Inmont Corp., 30 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 33,142, 34,285
(W.D.N.C. Sept. 2, 1982); Gibson v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Service, 541 F. Supp. 131 (S.D.N.Y.
1982); Gonzalez v. Chasen, 506 F. Supp. 990 (D.P.R. 1980). In an age discrimination case, EEOC v. Chrysler Corp.,
546 F. Supp. 54, 70 (E.D. Mich. 1982), for example, the court found:
The record reflects that claimants have suffered emotional stress, depression and increased drug use...
decrease in feelings of a useful and contracted social life... ; increased cigarette consumption ... ;depression
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Romero-Barcelo,226 for example, the Court held that a federal court may properly
decide not to issue an injunction even in the face of a proven violation unless
irreparability of injury and inadequacy of legal relief is shown.
Although it is not completely clear whether irreparability of injury and in-
adequacy of legal remedies are factors to be considered in the employment dis-
crimination cases, Moody and Franks strongly suggest that they are not. First, the
majority of the Justices did not discuss these equitable maxims in their opinions.
Second, implicit in Moody is that a finding of unlawful employment discrimination is
presumptive proof of irreparable injury and that the nature of the injury cannot be
adequately compensated with legal relief. 2z7 Another reason is based on the federal
rules. Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a finding of
irreparable injury prior to the issuance of temporary relief. 22 8 Rule 65(d) contains no
such requirement concerning permanent injunctive relief. The only requirement for
the issuance of a permanent injunction under Rule 65(d) is the obligation of the court
to set forth the reasons for issuance and a specification of the act sought to be
restrained.229
Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp.,230 decided just eight days before Moody,
seems to be at odds with the conclusion that irreparability and inadequacy of legal
remedies are not important factors in the relief stage in employment discrimination
cases. The case arose under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.231 The Act
requires full disclosure of information needed by investors who participate in the
securities market. The defendant failed to make full disclosure and the plaintiff
sought injunctive relief. The district court denied the injunction, but the court of
appeals reversed on the ground, inter alia, that irreparable injury was not a prerequi-
site to injunctive relief. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a showing of
irreparability of injury and inadequacy of legal remedies is necessary before a private
litigant can obtain injunctive relief under section 13(b) of the Act.232 Chief Justice
Burger, writing for the majority and relying in part on Hecht Co. v. Bowles,233 held
that injunctive relief is a "remedy whose basis 'in the federal courts has always been
and lassitude ... ; sexual problems ... ; depression and reduced sense of well-being .... It is significant to
the Court's decision that the psychological and physiological distress suffered by the claimants is the very type
of injury Congress sought to avert when it banned involuntary retirement.
226. 456 U.S. 305 (1982).
227. Perhaps the reason that the courts have not found the irreparability rule to be a necessary requirement for the
issuance of a permanent injunction in the employment discrimination cases is based on the willingness of the courts to
adopt an almost conclusive presumption that a finding of unlawful employment discrimination constitutes irreparable
injury. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes Int'l. Corp., 415 F.2d 1038, 1045 (5th Cir. 1969), in which the court stated that
when statutory rights of employees are involved and an injunction is authorized by statute, the usual prerequisites of
irreparable injury need not be established. See also Middleton-Keir v. Stone, 655 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1981) (irreparable
injury presumed in both the public and private sectors). But see EEOC v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 666 F.2d 1037, 1041
(6th Cir. 1981).
228. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
229. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d).
230. 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
231. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-kk (1982).
232. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 57 (1975).
233. 321 U.S. 321 (1944).
THE MOODY AND FRANKS STANDARDS
irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal remedies.' ,234 It is difficult to distinguish
Rondeau from Moody on any rational basis insofar as the role of equitable discretion
is concerned, except to note that the Court was unwilling to extend the concepts of
irreparability and inadequacy of legal remedies to the employment discrimination
cases.
C. The Unusual Circumstances Doctrine
1. Burden of Proof
Two separate issues are involved when considering the allocation of burdens of
proof. The first is issue allocation, that is, which party has the risk of nonpersuasion
on a given issue in a case, and the second concerns the standard to be used for the
satisfaction of that burden-preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing
evidence, or some lighter or heavier burden.235 The plaintiff has the burden of proof
on all issues in the liability determination stage, except on those defenses properly
classified as affirmative defenses.236 Once a plaintiff has prevailed in the liability
determination stage, he or she has the benefit of the strong Moody presumption of
entitlement to complete relief and the burden of proof on the issue of denial of
complete relief or denial of a particular form of relief is on the defendant. The clear
and convincing standard is the measure the court should use to determine if the
defendant has satisfied the burden.
The Supreme Court did not specifically address the burden of proof issue for
stage II proceedings. The Court stated in Franks, however, in reference to future
applicants under the hiring relief ordered by the trial court, that "[n]o reason appears
... why the victim rather than the perpetrator of the illegal act should bear the
burden of proof on" the issue of showing that future applicants, who have the benefit
of a presumption of liability, were not in fact victims of previous hiring dis-
crimination. 3 Similar reasoning should be applied as a general proposition in stage
II proceedings. The lower courts have allocated the burden of proof, by a clear and
convincing standard, 2 8 to the defendants to show reasons why back pay should be
denied," 9 but the presumptive entitlement to make-whole relief should relieve the
plaintiff of the burden of proof in stage II on all forms of relief.
234. 422 U.S. 49, 57 (1975).
235. See generally Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of Procedural
Justice, 34 VAND. L. REv. 1205 (1981).
236. Id. at 1214; FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
237. 424 U.S. 747, 773 n.32 (1976).
238. The difficult standards of proof involved in stage Il proceedings are discussed in Special Project-Back Pay, 35
VAND. L. Rev. 893, 982-94, 983 n.605 (1982).
239. See, e.g. Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Refining Corp., 495 F.2d 437 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1033
(1974); Special Project-Back Pay, 35 VAND. L. REv. 893, 981-92 (1982). The order and allocation of the burdens of
proof that the Court established for stage I proceedings in Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248
(1981). are not applicable in stage II proceedings. Burdine requires the plaintiff to establish his or her claim of a statutory
violation by the preponderance of the evidence. See also Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases:
Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice, 34 VAND. L. REv. 1205 (1981).
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2. Balancing the Equities
Neither Moody nor Franks dispensed with the equitable notion of balancing the
equities in the relief formulation stage. These cases collectively, however, show that
this notion is relevant only to those aspects of relief that are designed to compel future
compliance by the defendants. Moody and Franks also make clear that the balance of
the equities must be tipped in favor of the victim of employment discrimination rather
than the innocent employees or applicants for employment unless a court is persuaded
that there are unusual circumstances tipping the balance in favor of the innocent third
parties. The unusual circumstances doctrine is perhaps the least clarified aspect of
Moody and Franks. Manhart and Ford Motor are simply illustrations of specific
examples of unusual circumstances that would justify balancing the equities in favor
of the innocent third parties; these cases, however, offer little doctrinal direction to
the lower courts.
Thus, a major task for the lower courts after Moody and Franks is to design
principled standards for the application of the unusual circumstances doctrine. This
task will necessarily require the court to identify with more particularity the interests
of both the victim of the employment discrimination and the innocent third parties.
This task, at a minimum, appears to involve three separate but interrelated issues: a
definitional statement of who qualifies as an innocent third party; an identification of
the interests of both the victim of unlawful employment discrimination and the
innocent third party; and a determination of who has standing to raise the interests of
the innocent third parties. The Court in Moody and Franks did not examine these
questions; both the majority and the dissenters simply assumed that innocent third
parties existed and that it was appropriate for the defendants to represent, or at least
make an argument on behalf of, the innocent third parties. Thus, for example, the
employer in Franks was concerned only about the efficiency and trustworthiness of
job performance, whether done by the victims of discrimination or the innocent third
parties.2 4 This section will offer some suggestions on the three questions raised
above.
a. Defining the Innocent Victims
The court should find that an employee or applicant is an innocent victim if he or
she has received an employment benefit that would not have been available but for
the defendant's unlawful employment discrimination. This working definition of the
innocent victim seems valid because an employee who has obtained an advantage in
employment opportunity not based on the unlawful employment discrimination of the
defendant should remain unaffected by any relief a court may order. The recon-
structed history approach that the courts have adopted in the back pay cases should
ease the problem of determining who would not have received an employment oppor-
tunity but for the unlawful conduct of the defendant. The courts will have to second-
guess when making the determination of what the conditions and relationship would
240. 424 U.S. 747, 787 n.5 (1976) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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have been but for the unlawful conduct. The courts should avoid the temptation to use
"hindsight logic, '"241 and should engage in every reasonable assumption in favor of
the victim of discrimination.
b. Standing to Raise Interests of Innocent Victims
Most courts have assumed that the defendants have standing to raise the interests
of innocent third parties in employment discrimination cases. The problem in allow-
ing the defendants to raise the issue of innocent victims is that defendants have a
vested interest in the status quo.242 When the issue of innocent third parties is raised,
the court should provide notice to these parties and should allow intervention by them
so they may assert their own interests. Once the potential third parties have been
identified with reasonable certainty and have been given the opportunity to be heard,
due process will not be offended if the court grants complete relief even when no third
parties appear. Notice and opportunity to be heard are procedures that the courts
regularly use in class action cases in both the certification stage and in the settlement
of cases. 243 The courts have also allowed liberal intervention in the quota cases. 244
Allowing the defendant to represent the interests of third parties raises an ethical
problem similar to the situation in which an attorney in an employment discrimination
case simultaneously negotiates a settlement for a plaintiff and his own attorney's
fees. 245 The courts in the settlement and fee negotiation cases have held that the
apparent conflict of interest must be avoided.2 46
241. See Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978) (discussing the standard for fee awards to
prevailing defendants in Title V11 cases). The balancing of the equities doctrine has been aptly described by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter
"Balancing the equities" when considering whether an injunction should issue, is lawyers' jargon for choosing
between conflicting public interests. When Congress itself has struck the balance, has defined the weight to be
given the competing interests, a court ofequity is not justified in ignoring that pronouncement under the guise of
exercising equitable discretion.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 609-10 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Moreover, Chief
Justice Burger found it necessary to conclude in Swarm v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31 (1971),
that in "seeking to define the scope of remedial power ... of courts in an area as sensitive as [school desegregation],
words are poor instruments to convey the sense of basic fairness inherent in equity. Substance, not semantics, must
govern .... See also Allen v. Autauga County Bd. of Educ., 685 F.2d 1302, 1305 (11 th Cir. 1982) (reinstatement is a
basic element of appropriate relief for a wrongful discharge and, except in extraordinary cases, is required).
242. See, e.g., Local 189, United Papermakers and Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 988 (5th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 548 F. Supp. 104 (W.D.N.C. 1982).
243. See F. R. Civ. P. 23. Rule 23(c)(2) requires notice to class members in a 23(b)(3) class, but Rule 23(d)(2)
leaves it to the court to decide whether to provide notice in the (b)(2) class. Most class actions in the employment
discrimination cases are certified as (b)(2) class actions. See, e.g., General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon,
457 U.S. 147 (1982); Rule v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Ironworkers, Local 396, 568 F.2d
558 (8th Cir. 1977); Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975).
244. See, e.g., Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979); Jones, Litigation Without
Representation: The Need for Intervention To Affirm Affirmative Action, 14 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 31 (1979). See
also United Airlines v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977).
245. See, e.g., Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338, 1352 (9th Cir. 1980); Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557
F.2d 1015, 1020-21 (3d Cir. 1977). See generally Levin, Practical, Ethical and Legal Considerations Involved in the
Settlement of Cases in Which Statutory Attorney's Fees are Authorized, 14 CLEAMiutousE RaV. 515 (1980).
246. See supra note 245.
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c. Interests to be Protected
The Court has vacillated between characterizing the interests of the innocent
victims as employment expectancies 247 and as vested rights.248 It seems clear that the
interests of the innocent victims are properly characterized as employment expectan-
cies. The injury to victims of discriminatory employment practices include more than
the loss of employment expectancies. The range of identifiable injuries that can be
suffered by persons who are victims of discrimination is pervasive. The injured
interests include: Financial, 249 psychological,2 0 and social,2 1 as well as damage to
the plaintiff's physical well-being,25 2  professional pride,253  professional op-
portunity,2 54 self-esteem, and self-worth. 255 The courts must begin to take account of
these interests and injuries in factoring and weighing under the balance of the equities
calculus. Some courts accord these nonpecuniary factors great weighty 6 Other
courts tend to disparage these factors or question the evidentiary basis for their
support.1 7 A principled approach to balancing the equities must consider these and
other factors because of their well-recognized impact.
Defendants often rely on the hostility and antagonism that has either developed
as a result of litigation or would be likely to ensue if complete relief (for example,
reinstatement or a hiring preference), was granted. 258 Hostility or antagonism that
results from an individual seeking vindication of rights protected under federal law is
a factor hardly worthy of consideration, particularly in those cases in which the
247. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747,778 (1976); Tilton v. Missouri Pacific R. Co.,
376 U.S. 169 (1964); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
248. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 353 (1977).
249. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Chasen, 506 F. Supp. 990, 998-99 (D.P.R. 1980); Morrow v. Inmont, 30 Empl. Prac.
Dec. (CCH) 33, 142 (W.D.N.C. 1982). But see Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61 (1974). The courts fail to recognize
that employability is the greatest asset most people have. Id. at 95 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
250. See, e.g., Foster v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 555 F. Supp. 330, 337 (D. Colo. 1983) (discrimination
proximately caused embarrassment, humiliation, severe anxiety, and great emotional stress).
251. See, e.g., EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 546 F. Supp. 54, 70 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
252. Id.
253. See, e.g., Crawley v. Board of Educ. of Marion County, 658 F.2d 450, 452 (6th Cir. 1981); Foster v. MCI
Telecommunications Corp., 555 F. Supp. 330, 337 (D. Colo. 1983).
254. See, e.g., Farkas v. New York State Dep't of Health, 554 F. Supp. 24, 26 (N.D.N.Y. 1982) (monetary
compensation insufficient to repair damage to professional reputation).
255. See, e.g., Ford Motor Corp. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219 (1982).
256. See, e.g., Allen v. Autauga County Bd. of Educ., 685 F.2d 1302, 1306 (1Ith Cir. 1982). The courts are in
disagreement over the applicable standard for reinstatement, hiring preference, and promotion. Some courts hold that
reinstatement must be ordered unless extraordinary circumstances are present. See, e.g., Burton v. Cascade School Dist..
13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 283 (9th Cir. 1975). Other courts hold that a weighing of the equities is inappropriate in
the reinstatement cases. Id. at 286. (Lumbard, J., dissenting). Other courts consider the reinstatement remedy to be a
drastic form of relief. See, e.g., Seymour v. Olin Corp., 666 F.2d 202, 211 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court has
noted that "because of what we have found to be the statutory purpose, there is doubtless little room for the exercise of
discretion not to order reinstatement." Mitchell v. DeMario Jewelry, 361 U.S. 288, 296 (1960).
257. See, e.g., Monroe v. United Airlines, 31 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 33,330 (N.D. III. Jan. 12, 1983); Williams
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 660 F.2d 1267 (8th Cir. 1981) (collecting cases).
258. See, e.g., Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 131 (1982)
(argument accepted); Cline v. Roadway Express, Inc., 689 F.2d 481,489 (4th Cir. 1982) (argument rejected); Sterzing v.
Fort Bend Indep. School Dist., 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1974) (argument rejected). See also Pred v. Board of Public
Instruction, 415 F.2d 851, 856 (5th Cir. 1969). The courts have generally rejected the common-law theory of personal
services contract as a basis to deny relief, or have simply not considered this theory applicable in the discrimination case.
[Vol. 44:571
THE MOODY AND FRANKS STANDARDS
plaintiff proved that he or she is the victim of unlawful discrimination. For a court to
accept this reasoning as a basis for denying or otherwise limiting complete make-
whole relief is incongruous with the purpose of the private attorney general theory
that the courts have used to describe these cases, and would involve the court itself as
an instrument of perpetuating those practices that Congress wishes eliminated." 9
3. Reasons Must Be Articulated When Complete Relief Denied
Moody requires the courts to "carefully articulate" 2 60 its reasons when it denies
or otherwise limits complete relief or a just result based on the circumstances peculiar
to the particular case. This obligation is not onerous in most instances because Rule
52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a court, sitting without a jury,
to make findings of fact. The predicate for relief should be set out in those findings so
that, in the relief formulation stage, a court need only add to these findings. Too
often, the courts, with nothing more than a bow to fact finding on the basis of
equitable discretion, deny or otherwise limit complete relief.261 Moody and Franks
dictate an end to this practice.
4. Good Faith
The good faith defense was soundly rejected in Moody as a basis for denial of
relief in the form of back pay, although the Court recognized that the doctrine of
laches may be available to reduce the award. The Court has not spoken directly to the
good faith defense in a case involving a form of relief other than back pay. There
appears to be no reason that the good faith defense should be available as a defense to
other forms of relief in light of the Franks expansion of Moody to nonmonetary forms
of relief. The defense of good faith can be asserted in many guises by a defendant, but
the courts must be sensitive to the multi-faceted methods of asserting this defense.
VI. CONCLUSION
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and McDonnell Douglas v. Green2 62 established an
important doctrinal framework for the evaluation of substantive claims of liability in
stage I proceedings. The lower courts have attempted to fashion principled standards
within the guidelines set by Griggs and McDonnell Douglas. An equally important
aspect of achieving the national policy embodied in the federal laws against employ-
ment discrimination involves the relief formulation phase to remedy proven viola-
tions. Moody and Franks have established the doctrinal framework for the relief
formulation stage and have mandated that the courts apply principled standards in this
259. See Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 34 (5th Cir. 1968).
260. 422 U.S. 405, 421 n.14 (1975).
261. See, e.g., Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 31 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 33, 429 (8th Cir. 1983).
262. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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phase of the litigation. Too little attention has been given to the development of
principled standards and it is the hope that this Article will act as a "spur or catalyst"
for the courts to begin that process-in earnest-by recognizing the new dimensions
of equitable discretion in the relief formulation stage of employment discrimination
cases.
